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Parliament and the Industrial Power 
Andrew Frazer 
 
Introduction 
The industrial power contained in section 51(xxxv) of the Australian Constitution gives the 
Federal Parliament power to make laws with respect to ‘conciliation and arbitration for the 
prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.’ 
Throughout the history of the Commonwealth, this power has remained one of the most 
contentious and litigated clauses in the Constitution. Because of the constitutional limits on 
the manner in which national legislative power can be exercised in this area, the institutions 
and processes of the Federal system of conciliation and arbitration have remained a consistent 
focus of public debate.  
The industrial power is unusual in not giving Parliament direct power to legislate outcomes; 
rather it requires use of a particular method (conciliation and arbitration) and then only in 
certain circumstances (interstate industrial disputes). Since 1904 national industrial relations 
policy has relied on implementation of the industrial power through a permanent and 
independent arbitration tribunal (from 1904 to 1956 the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation 
and Arbitration; between 1956 and 1988 the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission; and since 1988 the Australian Industrial Relations Commission). Yet over the 
last decade an institution considered one of the more enduring features of Australia’s 
federated history has been challenged by demands for reduction of industrial regulation in the 
interest of efficiency and competitiveness. 
 
The Founders and their Vision 
Nineteen Fateful Words: The Federation Debates 
When the first Federation Convention assembled in Sydney in March 1891, the colonies of 
Australasia had recently experienced the most bitter and disruptive strike in their history. The 
Maritime strike, which simultaneously involved the key wool and shipping industries, shook 
away the complacent view that Australia had left behind the class enmity and industrial strife 
of the old world. Coming at the end of a long boom of prosperity in the late nineteenth 
century, it heralded nearly a decade of industrial struggle between the newly-formed mass 
unions, which campaigned for recognition as legitimate bargaining partners in the setting of 
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industrial conditions, and employers demanding the unilateral right of ‘freedom of contract’ 
to determine terms of employment on an individual basis. The strike highlighted the 
economic interdependence of the colonies: apart from the inevitable effects of disruption in 
the shipping industry, stoppages by coalminers in New South Wales made for a scarcity of 
coal and gas in Melbourne, causing factories to shut down and families to eat their dinners 
cold. Even as the delegates to the first Constitutional Convention in Sydney began their work, 
the next major contest — the Queensland pastoral strike — was already escalating into armed 
hostility, with military forces despatched to break up the shearers’ camps. 
It was in this context that the South Australian politician Charles Cameron Kingston proposed 
to the first Convention that the Federal Parliament should be given legislative power for ‘the 
establishment of courts of conciliation and arbitration, having jurisdiction throughout the 
commonwealth, for the settlement of industrial disputes.’1 Kingston had only a few months 
before presented a bill to create such courts in his home colony. He put forward his novel 
ideas for encouraging collective agreements, backed by enforceable arbitration of industrial 
grievances, to the New South Wales Royal Commission on Strikes which had been convened 
to find solutions to major industrial disturbances like the Maritime strike.2 Kingston claimed 
that his proposal for Federal tribunals would not interfere with the powers held by the colonial 
parliaments; but the recent strikes showed that widespread industrial disturbances could only 
be addressed by a national body. 
Kingston consented to leave the matter until the discussion on the Federal judiciary, when he 
argued for power allowing the Federal legislature to call tribunals into existence as the need 
arose. The motion was solidly opposed by conservatives like Sir Samuel Griffith, Premier of 
Queensland, as an interference with property and civil rights — matters which were decidedly 
the preserve of the States. Kingston attempted to circumvent such hostility by arguing that the 
terms of the legislation should be entrusted to the good sense and discretion of the Federal 
Parliament. The proposal was defeated by 25 votes to 12. In the course of the brief debate, 
delegates were not entirely clear whether the draft Constitution should allow Parliament to 
dictate directly the actual terms of settlement of particular strikes and lockouts, or whether the 
power would only extend to the establishment of machinery for hearing disputes.3
The matter was raised again at the Adelaide Convention in 1897, by which time conditions 
had changed dramatically. There was by now an active conciliation and arbitration system in 
New Zealand, which by most accounts was operating successfully. Kingston had succeeded in 
getting a compromise system enacted in South Australia. In New South Wales the newly-
formed Labor party had initiated a long debate over the merits of various schemes for making 
arbitration effective, while in Victoria wages boards had been established by legislation in 
1896 to set minimum wage rates for the most exploitive (‘sweated’) trades.4 As Quick and 
Garran put it, by the time of the Adelaide Convention, ‘political thought had developed and 
5
public sentiment had ripened’ in favour of a state-sanctioned industrial arbitration system of 
the kind originally advocated by Kingston.5
This time it was the Victorian liberal Henry Bournes Higgins who pursued the issue, 
proposing the inclusion of ‘industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State’ 
to the Federal Parliament’s list of legislative powers. Like Kingston before him, he noted that 
this proposal was facilitative and did not actually require Parliament to establish a court for 
the purpose; nor did he wish to prescribe the method which might be used to resolve such 
disputes.6 Then Kingston rose to speak in support, announcing that his preferred amendment 
would read ‘conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial 
disputes.’ He did not see the need for the Federal legislative power to be limited to interstate 
disputes. A national court ‘would exercise a wider jurisdiction and command greater respect 
and confidence than can be hoped for under any system of provincial legislation.’ The official 
responsible for administering any Federal legislation could be trusted to determine whether a 
particular dispute was better dealt with at the Federal or State level.7
While Kingston saw no problems with overlapping jurisdictions, since Federal and State 
measures would complement rather than conflict with each other, Higgins’ approach was to 
avoid potential inconsistency by limiting Federal jurisdiction to interstate disputes which were 
inherently beyond the domain of any State. He subsequently admitted that he had inserted the 
interstateness qualification in order to calm fears that the Federal tribunal would intervene in 
purely local disputes.8 The Victorian liberal, Alfred Deakin, gave support to the idea of 
arbitration in principle, but thought that Higgins’ approach was no answer to the jurisdictional 
difficulties, since it would never be clear precisely at what point a dispute had passed from 
State to Federal control. He was joined by B.R. Wise of New South Wales, who thought that 
local bodies were more competent to deal with industrial matters, and was wary lest a central 
authority might set uniform wages across the country irrespective of local conditions. 
Higgins’ proposal lost by 22 votes to 12, having failed to gain support even from some 
liberals who, like Deakin and Wise, sympathised with state intervention to promote industrial 
conciliation. 
Higgins continued to push the amendment at the Melbourne Convention the following year. 
This time it was a compromise motion that was put forward, embracing the reference to 
conciliation and arbitration urged by Kingston together with the interstateness limitation 
adopted by Higgins. Both these proponents urged that, as framers of an enduring Constitution, 
the delegates should provide the Federal Parliament with sufficient power to create tribunals 
if they were needed, and that the contours and limits of the power could safely be left to the 
elected legislators of the new Commonwealth. ‘Trust the Federal Parliament’ was their 
slogan.9
The New South Wales Premier, George Reid, envisaged that allowing Federal jurisdiction 
over interstate disputes would provide a strong incentive for disputants to ‘extend the 
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mischief and evil into another State ... in order to shift the venue of the tribunal which will try 
the dispute.’10 Deakin thought that the power was ‘not likely to be exercised by the Federal 
Parliament for many years to come,’ but that it should be included to provide ‘in advance for 
all conceivable federal contingencies.’ But, as Higgins warned in his concluding address, the 
federation of labour across the country was likely to bring ever more disputes within the 
national domain.11 When it came to a vote, Higgins’ motion passed narrowly by 22 votes to 
19. Compared with the defeat the previous year, the proposal gained approval largely because 
it attracted the support of the Western Australian delegation led by the Premier, John Forrest. 
While Forrest was no radical, he saw a need for government to intervene in industrial 
disruptions and thought that the power would be exercised more carefully and moderately by 
a Federal parliament than by local legislatures which might be subject to sectional interests 
(he no doubt had the labour movement in mind).12 
At the time of its insertion into the Constitution, nearly all the major problems that would 
emerge with the operation of the industrial power had been foreseen: the difficulties in 
demarcating the domains of Federal and State authority, the right of States to control local 
matters; the appropriateness of a judicial model; the occupations and industries to be covered; 
the extension to State government employees; the difficulties of enforcement; the intrusion on 
business and property; the accommodation of regional differences. Many of these are the 
inevitable result of maintaining the concurrent jurisdiction of central and provincial 
government in a strong federal system; others stem from the fact of state intervention in 
industrial (and consequently wider economic) affairs. Some issues derive from prescribing the 
methods of conciliation and arbitration for resolving disputes, and are compounded by the 
interpretation that this requires an adversarial court-like system which does not however 
exercise judicial power.  
Ultimately the ability for such issues to become constitutional controversies originates in the 
vagueness of the founders and their willingness to defer such difficult issues to the Parliament 
to resolve while giving it limited power to do so. There never was a single clear vision of the 
industrial power among the framers of the Constitution. The measure was unusually hard-
fought: as Deakin later recalled, no other proposal had been debated three times.13 Eventually 
a majority of votes was gained on the basis of an independent judicial tribunal with power to 
settle disputes which affected the whole nation. To the extent that the proposal gained 
widespread acceptance, it was due to three main factors: the built-in limitations introduced by 
Higgins’ and Kingston’s compromise (especially interstateness); the assurance that any 
scheme would be framed by a legislature subject to the popular will (moderated by an upper 
house with equal representation by the States); and the confidence reposed in a judicial 
tribunal which would most likely be headed by a judge. The industrial power gained 
acceptance because of its restrictions and qualifications, not despite them.  
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The Vision Established: The Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
Demands began early to implement a national system of industrial conciliation and 
arbitration. At Kingston’s insistence the Liberal party promised such legislation at the first 
Federal election, although the party leader, Edmund Barton, expected that the occasion for its 
use would seldom arise.14 A bill was foreshadowed, but like many other important measures it 
was not reached during the first session. A revised version was prepared by Kingston, but he 
resigned only weeks before he was due to present it to Parliament, ostensibly because the 
Cabinet refused to support his proposal to have the Bill extend to crews on foreign ships 
operating on the Australian coastal trade (Barton argued, probably correctly, that such a 
measure would be unconstitutional).15 So it fell to Alfred Deakin to introduce legislation in 
July 1903 establishing the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. He stressed 
that the bill was ‘federal in all its characteristics,’ not only because it was confined to 
interstate disputes, but also because it allowed the Court to co-operate with similar State 
bodies by referring matters to them. State industrial tribunals could also refer specific matters 
to the Commonwealth Court for determination.16 
Like earlier measures adopted in the States, the legislation was designed first of all to promote 
the making of enforceable collective agreements. If disputant parties failed to settle their 
differences in this way the state, in the form of an independent tribunal, could be called to 
assist, firstly to encourage amicable agreement by conciliation, and if this were not possible, 
by hearing both sides and making an equitable and enforceable award. In return for this legal 
avenue of redress, and to protect the public interest, strikes and lockouts would be prohibited. 
Deakin was aware that the scheme involved a transformation in industrial affairs, one which 
the legislature itself could not hope to produce and only a separate tribunal could accomplish: 
It must be at once clear that however much Parliament might desire to take into its own 
hands the immediate regulation of industrial affairs, and to provide for the suppression of 
their vendettas, it would be incompetent to do so, notwithstanding all its authority, by 
reason of the immense complexity of the task cast upon it.... We realize nowadays that 
society is a living organism in every sense of the term.... The rigid provisions of 
legislation, therefore, must necessarily be ineffective in dealing with a living society. 
The only way to cope with the ever-changing, ever developing needs and forms of 
unfoldment in society and its industries is to create some authority of independent minds, 
able to follow its workings so far as their knowledge and ability permit, and to assist its 
progress by adapting forces to foster growth, not once, but from time to time.17 
The great significance of this approach was that it would extend the reign of law and justice 
into the industrial arena by an impartial method for settling disputes. Parliament was not to 
intervene by setting the terms of the Court’s inquiries. The Court was given no other remit 
than to determine disputes according to equity, good conscience and the merits of the case; 
although in time it was expected that precedents would develop to guide the results of future 
cases. ‘No attempt is made to enforce any theory or doctrine. The court is asked to do justice, 
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and no more than justice.’18 By adopting the method of judicial arbitration in this way a more 
comprehensive system of direct regulation by the legislature was rejected. 
The Bill was destined to falter over coverage of State railway employees. The Irvine 
Government in Victoria had recently insisted that its railway workers should disaffiliate with 
the local Trades Hall; when the workers went on strike in protest, the Government passed 
legislation making such strikes illegal. In the Commonwealth Parliament the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) members insisted that employees of State Government railways should have 
access to the Federal arbitration system; Deakin strongly demurred, arguing that such a step 
was not only unconstitutional but violated the federal balance by overriding the States’ 
powers of self-government. When the amendment passed in the House, the Government 
abandoned the Bill.19
At the election in 1903 all parties supported a national arbitration system in some form. The 
election resulted in a House split between the three parties. Deakin’s Liberals retained office, 
and the Parliament assembled in the new year with the Bill as one of the Government’s first 
priorities. When an ALP amendment to extend coverage to all government employees 
succeeded against Deakin’s entreaties, he treated the vote as a confidence motion and the 
Liberal ministry resigned to great surprise.20 They were replaced by the short-lived Watson 
Labor Government which resigned after four months when it failed to gain sufficient support 
to continue passage of the Bill. Both the opposition parties wanted to restrict the Arbitration 
Court’s ability to order that preference in employment be given to unionists; the Labor 
Government insisted on leaving the Court with a large discretion over when to award it.21 
Eventually a coalition ministry led by George Reid was formed and succeeded in putting the 
Bill through all stages by December 1904 despite a stand-off between the Houses over the 
preference issue: the Labor-controlled Senate eventually backed down and agreed to greater 
restrictions. 
The legislation which finally passed was the product of a range of political opinion. 
Underpinning the debate was an acceptance that the Bill had gained popular support at the 
election. Although there were a few strident critics of the very notion of compulsory 
arbitration, they were in the distinct minority and there was widespread (if sometimes 
reluctant) agreement on most of the general principles. Reid, for example, had reservations at 
the incursions which the Bill made on individual rights and liberties, but justified them as 
necessary to prevent greater harm.22 Some members were concerned that the legislation did 
not define which disputes were interstate but relied on the vague words of the Constitution 
and the Arbitration Court’s interpretation, thus allowing uncertainty and potential erosion of 
the States’ domain.23 Much of the voting in Parliament was tactical, based on political 
manoeuvre and point-scoring rather than philosophical conviction. There were significant 
ideological differences, though, over the exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers from 
the Act and especially over the extent to which employment preference could be awarded to 
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unionists. Labor members argued that preference was needed to protect unionists from 
victimisation and to encourage them to make use of the new system, while traditional liberals 
like Reid objected to it as a special privilege but were willing to accept some measure if 
individual objections could be put to the Arbitration Court.  
The Federal arbitration system was slow to develop, with only six awards being made in its 
first five years of operation. The Act required the President of the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration to be a judge of the High Court, and it was anticipated that the 
position would be a part-time one which would only be activated when pressing disputes 
arose. The first President, from 1905 to 1907, was Justice O’Connor, who played little role in 
the development of Federal arbitration. It was Justice Higgins who, as second President from 
1907 to 1920, gave real substance to the jurisdiction. Higgins occupied the unusual position 
of constitutional founder, legislative drafter (briefly, as Attorney-General in the Watson Labor 
Government), and eventually the judicial administrator of the Federal industrial jurisdiction. It 
was his vision of an independently-minded judicial tribunal, deciding disputes using ordinary 
legal procedures but according to general principles of fairness and equity, which so heavily 
influenced the operations of the Court over its first two decades.  
At first, the system resembled the aims of the founders: it was mainly unions in the key 
interstate maritime, waterside and shearing industries which approached the Court. Other 
unions registered under the Commonwealth Act but remained largely State-based 
organisations pursuing their demands in the State systems. The new Act soon faced a 
concerted campaign of resistance by employers, who organised in order to bring a succession 
of constitutional challenges before the High Court and met with a strong measure of success.24 
Applications for Federal awards increased once the High Court began taking an expansive 
attitude to the Federal arbitration jurisdiction between 1913 and 1926.  
 
Early Attempts to Expand the Industrial Power 
First Moves 
The scope of legitimate industrial regulation was considerably widened once a policy of 
uniform tariff protection for local manufacturing had been adopted by the first 
Commonwealth Parliament, with such protection linked to favourable wages and conditions 
for Australian workers. In the first private member’s motion in the House of Representatives, 
H.B. Higgins called on the Commonwealth Parliament to acquire, with the consent of the 
States, ‘full power to make laws for Australia as to wages and hours and conditions of 
labour.’ The motion gained widespread support from Labor and liberal members; the recent 
introduction of a Federal tariff was enough to change the minds of even some former 
federation delegates, who now accepted that employment conditions and wages were matters 
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of national significance. While Higgins’ motion was adopted, no State government was found 
sufficiently willing to divest itself of its plenary industrial power and the matter was not 
pursued.25 
The Deakin liberal Government, with Labor party support, introduced the policy of New 
Protection, which  rested on the linkage of beneficial wages and conditions to protective 
tariffs and immigration restriction. A key mechanism of this policy was the Excise Tariff 
(Agricultural Machinery) Act 1906, under which local manufacturers could gain exemption 
from excise duty if the wages they paid were in accordance with a Federal award, or were 
declared ‘fair and reasonable’ by resolution of both Houses of Parliament or by decision of 
the President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. It was under this 
Act that Justice Higgins, now President of the Court, determined in November 1907 the basis 
for a living wage in what became known as the Harvester judgment.26 Yet only seven months 
later the Act under which Higgins made his landmark decision was deemed constitutionally 
invalid by the High Court because the legislation was essentially concerned with the 
regulation of employment conditions, a power not held by the Commonwealth Parliament and 
not capable of being supported by the excise power.27 Other key aspects of the New Protection 
policy — the registration of the ‘union label’ as a trade mark certifying that goods were made 
by union members working under beneficial conditions, and the outlawing of (principally 
foreign-owned) monopolies — were also declared unconstitutional by the High Court.28 
While the Harvester case itself was closely followed by members of parliament, the decision’s 
wider significance was not appreciated until Higgins continued to rely on the needs-based 
approach to set basic wage rates in subsequent cases under the Arbitration Act.29 
In response to these setbacks, Deakin privately suggested a constitutional amendment which 
would allow for uniform Commonwealth regulation of employment in industries which were 
protected by customs duties. This system would be operated by the Inter-State Commission, a 
body of mixed judicial and administrative powers envisaged under section 101 of the 
Constitution; though Deakin’s plan would require a constitutional amendment allowing the 
Federal Parliament to devolve quasi-legislative responsibility for uniform industrial 
conditions onto the Commission.30 A modified version of this idea was floated at the 1909 
Premiers’ Conference, where the States agreed to introduce legislation referring State powers 
on industrial conditions to the Commonwealth, using the Inter-State Commission as a 
national standard-setting body.31 Like many similar plans, it was never carried out. 
 
Hughes and Industrial Nationalism 
While the policy of liberals like Deakin gravitated towards expansion of Federal powers over 
industrial conditions, an enhanced Federal industrial power had been an early aspect of 
Labor’s policy: the party’s national conference adopted ‘uniform industrial legislation’ as a 
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plank in 1902, although the item was rejected by the New South Wales party at its annual 
conference.32 By 1908 the Labor party at the national level was confirmed in its centralist 
approach to industrial regulation and convinced that its policies could only be carried out by 
constitutional change, since the High Court had shown a restrictive attitude to the powers of 
the Commonwealth Arbitration Court in a succession of cases. The most contentious of these 
was Whybrow’s case, where a majority of the High Court engaged in a narrow reading of the 
meaning of ‘arbitration’ in section 51(xxxv), thus finding that the Arbitration Court was 
constitutionally debarred from declaring any of its awards as a common rule for a whole 
industry. This meant that unions (and employers) who wanted award conditions to apply 
uniformly across an industry had to ensure that every employer in an industry became a party 
to the dispute by being served with a separate notice of demand and log of claims. This 
requirement extended the delay and cost of proceedings in the Federal jurisdiction 
immeasurably. The conviction developed in Labor circles that a conservative judiciary was 
determined to block the popular will, a view amplified by Higgins’ exasperated statement 
from the Arbitration Court bench that, as a result of constitutional interpretations, ‘the 
approach to the Court is through a veritable Serbonian bog of technicalities; and the bog is 
extending.’33 
Such a view was the basis of changes which were introduced by Labor’s Attorney-General, 
the Hon. W.M. Hughes, as soon as the party gained power federally in 1910. To overcome 
some of the restrictive judicial interpretations, Hughes introduced several amendments to the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, including one which expanded the definition of ‘industrial 
dispute’ to include ‘any threatened impending or probable dispute.’34 By such measures 
Hughes hoped to allow for greater use of the prevention power in section 51(xxxv) and to 
reduce legal formality. In the long term, though, Hughes was convinced that the party’s 
platform could only be achieved by taking control of social legislation out of the hands of the 
courts.35 He announced a referendum to expand the industrial power to include ‘the wages and 
conditions of labour and employment in any trade, industry or calling’ as well as general 
power for ‘the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes.’36 This expansion of power 
would avoid most of the legal restrictions of the existing provision, while additionally 
allowing for the direct statutory regulation of employment conditions if necessary.  
Against Hughes and his national vision, the Opposition argued that the referendum proposals 
disturbed the delicate balance of federalism by erasing the exclusive legislative domain of the 
States and abolishing the limitations on central power which were ‘a fundamental and organic 
part of the Federal scheme.’ Deakin was concerned that ‘the whole of the industrial powers of 
the States are to be transferred without limitation to the Commonwealth. The minutiae of 
every occupation throughout Australia will be the concern of the National Legislature.’37 
Deakin was joined in opposition to the amendments by members of the New South Wales 
Labor Government, led by Premier W.A. Holman who contended that the constitutional 
amendments would inevitably lead to the accretion of Federal power because inconsistent 
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State legislation would gradually become invalidated through the operation of section 109 of 
the Constitution. Even if this were not the case, State governments would scarcely bother to 
legislate if they could never be sure that the powers they now shared with the Federal 
Parliament in Melbourne were not about to be overruled. He proposed instead that the States 
should voluntarily cede their powers to the Commonwealth.38
Hughes was undeterred when the referenda lost. Although only 40 per cent of the voters 
supported the proposals, he immediately began planning another attempt at constitutional 
reform. In 1912 he presented five separate amendments, including a more detailed proposal 
on industrial matters which contemplated giving the Federal Parliament power to make laws 
with respect to ‘labour, employment, and unemployment.’ In Parliament Hughes argued that a 
‘broad national power’ was needed to preserve industrial peace; the existing words of the 
Constitution had proved wholly inadequate in giving the Arbitration Court scope to prevent 
disputes from escalating. What was being sought, he maintained, was no more than had been 
intended by the original framers of the Constitution and the Arbitration Act. The Government 
continued to deny that the proposed power would be used to legislate directly on employment 
conditions; the power would naturally be delegated to the Arbitration Court.39 
All the proposals again failed to gain popular approval, though with a smaller minority than 
before: the industrial question failed by just 1.3 per cent of the total formal vote, with three 
States polling majority support. The referendum debates reveal a change in Hughes’ thinking 
about the appropriate form of Federal legislative regulation of labour disputes. Hughes had 
long taken the view that the Federal Parliament’s power under section 51(xxxv) to prevent 
industrial disputes was ineffective, and could not support legislation designed to promote 
industrial peace by collective bargaining and joint regulation — an approach which his union-
organising days had convinced him was the only effective method of preventing strikes. 
The Labor party refused to let go of the constitutional reforms, even when out of power. In 
1914 a Labor-controlled Senate passed several referendum bills along the lines of the 1913 
proposals, including industrial powers, but they were not passed by the House and the 
Governor-General declined to submit them to the people.40 Labor regained power later that 
year after a double dissolution election fought over attempts to wind back the Act. The 
outbreak of war prompted the Labor Government to renew its campaign for expanded 
Commonwealth constitutional powers. Hughes admitted that Federal control over industrial 
matters could be enlarged by using the defence power, but argued that explicit constitutional 
provision was far preferable to a kind of ‘military despotism’ imposed through the uncertain 
interpretation of the defence power, which would elevate the High Court ‘to the position of a 
supreme legislative chamber.’ After a meeting with the Premiers it was agreed that instead the 
States would refer a range of powers to the Commonwealth for the duration of the war, so the 
referendum process was suspended. In the event only New South Wales passed the necessary 
legislation. The issue was temporarily circumvented by the High Court’s decision upholding 
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the expanded use of the defence power for control over domestic matters during wartime, 
while the split within the Labor party over the conscription issue prevented a further 
referendum on Federal powers.41 
The conclusion of the war was greeted with a wave of industrial unrest prompted by high 
inflation. For Hughes, who now led the non-Labor Nationalist Government, post-war 
reconstruction could only be achieved with uniform national powers over industrial relations. 
In September 1919 Hughes gained some acceptance by the Premiers for a referral of State 
powers to the Commonwealth for a period of three years pending further constitutional 
amendments. To deal with immediate post-war problems, proposals for extension of the 
Commonwealth’s powers in relation to industrial matters, as well as trade, corporations, trusts 
and monopolies, were again put to the people for approval until a mooted convention on the 
Constitution had considered the whole issue of the division of legislative powers.42 Again the 
proposals were rejected by the electorate, so the voluntary referral of State industrial powers 
never took place.  
While he remained in office, Hughes continued to seek an expansion of Federal powers, 
putting forward his plan for a wide-ranging review of the Constitution, and bemoaning that 
the national Parliament still could not address the conflict of labour and capital — ‘the great 
question of the time’ — by making a uniform national law.43 In the meantime, as a 
compromise, he presented a further proposal to the Premiers’ Conference in 1921. Now his 
idea was for the States to refer their industrial powers to the Commonwealth, which would 
legislate for a Federal arbitration system with jurisdiction over ‘Federal industries’ (primarily 
the waterfront and shipping), together with the basic wage and standard hours. The 
Commonwealth would also establish an Industrial Court of Appeal to rationalise competing 
awards in different States; but all other industries and matters would be reserved to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of State industrial tribunals. The Premiers’ initial approval soon turned 
to hostility as it was realised that the proposal would result in the gradual accretion of Federal 
power, as ever more industries became national in character, while uniform industrial 
conditions would be imposed across the country through the appeal process. 44 Doubtless this 
was no mistake.   
By this time, though, many of the constitutional obstacles to the expansion of the Federal 
domain in industrial relations had been overcome to some extent by a series of constitutional 
cases. The original judges of the High Court, who had also contributed to the drafting of the 
Constitution, took the view that the Federal industrial power was inherently limited: by the 
idea that industrial arbitration was a judicial method which required the finding of a definite 
dispute between particular parties, and by the sovereign domain of the States. According to 
this view, section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution conferred ‘a new power conferred upon a 
legislature of limited jurisdiction, which as a general rule has no authority to interfere with the 
domestic trade or industry of a State.’45 This approach to the Constitution was fundamentally 
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changed by new appointees to the Court, beginning with Higgins and Isaacs in 1906, but 
gaining dominance with the elevation of Gavan Duffy, Powers and Rich in 1913. These new 
judges were much more receptive to industrial arbitration as a legitimate area of state 
intervention, and more willing to allow the expansion of the Commonwealth arbitration 
system by a reading of the Constitution which was not restricted by an idea that Federal power 
was inherently limited by the pre-eminent rights of the States. By 1914 the new judges on the 
High Court had succeeded in replacing the original approach with an expanded ‘realist’ one 
which largely allowed the Arbitration Court itself to determine whether there was a dispute 
within its cognisance.46 The High Court judges were willing to allow the expansion of Federal 
jurisdiction because discretion was to be exercised by the judges of an independent tribunal. It 
is doubtful that such tolerance would have been accorded to the direct exercise of legislative 
power by the Parliament. 
 
The 1926 Referendum 
From the early 1920s the dual system of Federal and State industrial tribunals had come to be 
perceived as an increasing problem as the expansion of the Federal system resulted in many 
workplaces being regulated by overlapping and conflicting awards. The problem was mooted 
by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Stanley Melbourne Bruce, when announcing his 
Government’s program soon after he took over power from Hughes. To Bruce the problem 
was one of national efficiency. He hoped initially that some agreement with the Premiers 
might be able to demarcate industries as objects of regulation by either Federal or State 
authorities.47 While not by nature a centralist, it soon seemed to Bruce that the neatest and 
most efficient solution was one which involved either the exercise of joint Federal and State 
powers by a composite tribunal, or else giving the Federal body supreme authority. It soon 
became apparent that the use of joint power was impracticable: the States had consistently 
refused to cede their industrial powers, and any attempt to divide industries into State and 
Federal jurisdictions was impossible.48 
A proposal to amend the Constitution was outlined by the Attorney-General, John Latham, to 
a joint meeting of Nationalist and Country parties in May 1926, apparently without prior 
consultation.49 It was introduced into the House by Bruce three days later. The Government 
proposal involved removing the requirement for an interstate dispute from section 51(xxxv) 
and adding two additional clauses allowing the establishment of ‘authorities with such powers 
as the Parliament confers on them with respect to the regulation and determination of terms 
and conditions of industrial employment’ as well as investing State authorities with Federal 
industrial powers. The need for expansion of Commonwealth power was justified as the 
inevitable result of growth in national industries. The amendment was also designed to 
overcome difficulties with the existing clause which had been revealed by High Court 
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decisions, and to recognise the expanded meaning which that court had given to it. Latham 
noted that the proposal would allow for other forms of industrial regulation to be established, 
such as wages boards and conciliation committees. Speaking in Parliament, Bruce and 
Latham stressed that unlike previous referendum proposals, this one did not involve giving 
the legislature direct power to make laws on industrial matters, but required that the power be 
exercised by authorities independent of Parliament. At the same time the Government 
proposed a related constitutional amendment to give the Federal Parliament legislative power 
over essential services, a change prompted by recent strikes in the coal and transport 
industries.50 
The proposal met with a mostly hostile reception. Notably, the parliamentary debate made 
little reference to the intentions of the Constitution’s founders: rather, discussion was 
focussed squarely on making the arbitration system more efficient and in tune with modern 
industrial conditions. Federal ALP politicians initially supported the proposal as being in the 
Labor party’s tradition of seeking united national power over industrial relations, but thought 
that the referendum should be deferred until it could be considered in the review of the 
Constitution which had already been mooted by Bruce. The Leader of the Opposition, 
Matthew Charlton, favoured giving full and direct legislative power over industrial matters to 
the Federal Parliament, as earlier Labor-sponsored referendum proposals had envisaged. 
Many State-based unions and Labor politicians were wary of the amendment’s ability to 
undermine the advances gained through State legislation and industrial awards. With bitter 
division emerging across the labour movement, the Federal Parliamentary Labor party 
eventually decided not to take a fixed position on the referendum.51 Added to this, the 
proposal directly conflicted with State-rights sentiments, thereby provoking opposition from 
conservatives. With such a division of opinion, and with several key groups actively 
campaigning against amendment, it is not surprising that the proposal failed to win popular 
support at the referendum in September.  
Undeterred by the result, Bruce included the industrial power among the wide-ranging terms 
of reference given to the Royal Commission on the Constitution which was appointed in 
August 1927. A majority of the seven-member Commission recommended that it was the 
States that should carry exclusive responsibility for industrial regulation. Regarding industrial 
matters as inherently local rather than national in nature, being tied to such issues as public 
order, health and industrial development, the majority recommended the deletion of the 
Commonwealth’s existing power.52 By contrast, the minority report led by the two ALP 
members recommended that industrial matters be reserved to the Federal Parliament, in line 
with Labor’s preference for the Commonwealth having plenary legislative powers over maters 
of national significance.53 By the time the Report was presented in late 1929, the Bruce-Page 
Government had already been defeated over its proposals to abolish the Federal arbitration 
system along lines similar to those recommended by the majority of the Committee (discussed 
below).   
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Other Proposals for Constitutional Reform 
The Australian people have been asked to change the Constitution on 19 occasions; seven of 
these times have included requests to increase the Federal power in relation to industrial 
matters, employment or incomes. The table below summarises these proposals. Voters were 
asked specific questions dealing with industrial or employment issues in four referendums; at 
other times, industrial powers were included with a number of other proposals in the same 
question (although the industrial power was a major issue in all except the 1944 vote). On 
three occasions — in 1913, 1919 and 1946 — the proposals came close to approval. The 
closest any of the referendums came to success was in 1946 when a majority of formal votes 
favoured expansion of the Federal power, although the proposal did not obtain approval in a 
majority of States. Of the States, only Western Australia has consistently voted in favour of 
expansion of Federal power, while Queensland also approved Federal expansion in three of 
the early referendums up to 1926.  
 
Commonwealth Industrial Powers Referendums 
Year Proposal Total %  States 
in favour in favour 
1911 Labour & Employment (multi-power qn) 39.42 WA 
1913 Industrial Matters (of 5 qns) 49.33 Qld, SA, WA 
1919 Industrial Matters (multi-power qn) 49.65 Vic, Qld, WA 
1926 Industry & Commerce (of 2 qns) 43.50 NSW, Qld 
1944 Post-war Reconstruction (multi-power qn) 45.99 SA, WA 
1946 Industrial Employment (of 3 qns) 50.30 NSW, Vic, WA 
1973 Incomes (of 2 qns) 34.42 Nil 
Source: House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional 
Change: Select Sources on Constitutional Change in Australia 1901-1997, Canberra, 1997, pp. 61-97. 
After the failure of 1926-29, the last attempts to change the industrial power itself arose in the 
context of the Curtin and Chifley Labor governments’ wartime legislation, when special 
Commonwealth agencies had amassed control over most aspects of employment. Although 
the Federal Government assumed greatly enlarged powers of industrial regulation under the 
defence power, it was still thought desirable for the Commonwealth’s responsibilities in the 
area to be regularised. In order to avoid a referendum during wartime, a draft bill was 
presented to the Premiers in 1942 providing for the referral of State legislative powers to the 
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Federal Parliament. As with previous schemes, this proposal failed to gain support from the 
State Governments.54 Somewhat different in intent was the 1944 referendum on 
Commonwealth powers. Designed to assist post-war reconstruction, it included ‘employment 
and unemployment’ in its 14 specified matters which were proposed for transferral to the 
Federal Parliament for five years. It failed, with only 45 percent of voters approving the 
measure. Two years later a proposal to alter section 51(xxxv) by giving the Commonwealth 
power to make laws on ‘terms and conditions of employment in industry’ was again put 
forward  — and failed by a similar margin.55
The Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, appointed by the Menzies Government in 
1956, recommended in its report that the Federal Parliament’s existing legislative power be 
expanded to cover ‘terms and conditions of industrial employment.’ In the view of the 
committee it was time to end the inconsistencies which arose from leaving primary 
responsibility for regulation of industrial relations to the States. Noting that the Federal 
system now covered as many workers as the State systems, and that the economic role of the 
Commonwealth had expanded rapidly since the Second World War, the Committee 
considered it would be a retrograde and impracticable step to abolish the Federal system and 
leave industrial law to the States, as the 1929 Royal Commission had proposed.56 The report 
which it issued in 1959 was permeated by the view that government’s role now lay, not in the 
resolution of disputes which threatened to harm the public interest, but in the integrated and 
efficient management of factors affecting economic stability. 
The Committee thought that ‘it is inconsistent with responsible democratic government that 
independent tribunals without responsibility either to parliament or the people should be 
accorded, by the Constitution, the role of supreme legislators.’ This attitude broke with a 
tradition stretching back to the Federation debates — that state intervention was most safely 
left in the hands of an independent judicial body deciding according to principles of justice. 
The Committee did not, however, propose direct regulation by Parliament: it contemplated 
that Federal legislation would give governmental agencies the power to determine general 
principles which would then be applied by industrial tribunals. The Federal Parliament would 
acquire legislative competence over all aspects of industrial regulation, including factories, 
apprenticeships and industrial safety. Existing State tribunals would also be delegated power 
to set local conditions.57 
Recognising the difficulty of expanding the Commonwealth’s legislative power by 
constitutional alteration, opinion since the 1959 review has tended to favour other paths: 
either the reference of State powers to the Commonwealth under section 51(xxxvii) of the 
Constitution, or more informal solutions involving greater co-operation between the State and 
Federal tribunal systems. During the 1970s, discussion focussed on the mutual interchange of 
powers between the Commonwealth and the States, although wider constitutional problems 
associated with this approach prevented any specific proposals being put to referendum.58 
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Between 1979 and 1982 a review by Commonwealth and State labour ministers examined 
ways of making the various systems more complementary without resorting to constitutional 
alteration. The 1982 Premiers’ Conference unanimously agreed to a scheme of 
complementary legislation designed to promote co-operation between tribunals through such 
means as joint hearings and the referral of Federal matters to State bodies.59 Such an approach 
was the short-term solution favoured by the Hancock Committee in 1985 and implemented in 
the Industrial Relations Act 1988 with limited success. The Hancock Report’s long-term 
approach favoured a united effort to create a national system, either through a combination of 
Federal and State legislative powers or by the States referring their powers to the 
Commonwealth.60 
Proposals for changing the Constitution itself were raised by the Constitutional Convention in 
1983. Later that decade, the Constitutional Commission suggested widening the industrial 
power to include ‘industrial relations and employment matters,’ but thought that the 
Commonwealth’s power should remain concurrent with that of the States.61 Congruent with 
its general view that the national Parliament should have responsibility for all aspects of 
economic policy, in its final report in 1988 the Commission recommended that the 
Commonwealth’s legislative power be widened to cover ‘industrial relations.’ While such a 
change would remove nearly all fetters on the Federal legislature’s ability to mould industrial 
policy, the Commission was confident that, in view of its long history of adoption in this 
country, industrial arbitration would continue to remain a central feature.62 
In practice the arbitration system has managed to overcome or at least adapt itself to many of 
the problems of overlapping jurisdictions and dual coverage which have fuelled much of the 
debate over reform of the Constitution in the area of industrial relations. From an early stage, 
the primacy of the Federal tribunal was recognised by State tribunals, which tended to follow 
its lead in setting standard wages and conditions. Both State and Federal tribunals have tended 
to recognise each other’s priority and expertise in some industries, refraining from intervening 
in areas traditionally regulated by the other. A pattern of industry coverage between State and 
Federal systems gradually emerged, based on whether the industry was national in 
orientation.63 
The general tendency towards centralisation has been facilitated by High Court decisions. 
which have changed the pattern of occupational coverage. In the Professional Engineers Case 
the High Court allowed that professional and clerical employees could obtain access to the 
Federal system provided their employer operated in an area which could be described as 
‘industry.’64 Then in the Social Welfare Union Case of 1983 the arcane structure of 
constitutional decisions on the meaning of the term ‘industrial dispute’ was completely swept 
away in favour of an approach based on the ordinary meaning of the words of the 
Constitution.65 Since then a much wider range of employees have been able to obtain a 
Federal award, although conflicts between State and Federal jurisdictions do not seem to have 
19 
increased. Problems with federalism still arise over the regulation of State Government 
employees, with the High Court maintaining that the Federal system cannot hamper the 
capacity of the States to function as independent entities by dictating the number and identity 
of employees engaged in ‘the administrative services of the States’ through Federal dismissal 
and redundancy provisions.66
After decades of fruitless discussion, a reference of State powers was finally accomplished in 
1996 when the Victorian Parliament, controlled by the Kennett Liberal Government, made an 
extensive donation of its legislative powers on industrial relations to the Commonwealth. This 
allowed the Federal Commission to determine minimum terms and conditions for most 
employees in the State, as well as settling purely intrastate disputes.67 It is no surprise that 
recently the incoming Bracks Labor Government has sought to reclaim Victoria’s legislative 
power and re-establish its industrial relations system. 
 
The Parliamentary Record: Legislating on Industrial Disputes 
Throughout the history of the Federal Parliament, industrial relations has been a constant 
issue for debate and enactment. During its operation from 1904 to 1988 the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act was amended 87 times, including 60 changes of more than an administrative 
nature. Just as governments have sought to make wider use of the industrial power, they have 
frequently been curbed by decisions of the High Court, resulting in further amendments to 
deal with constitutional objections or to preserve the existing system.  
In the legislative history of the Federal industrial power, three periods stand out for the ways 
in which the constitutional vision was adapted. First, the 1920s saw successive governments 
searching for ways to resolve the division of powers between the Commonwealth and the 
States. The prevailing interpretation of the Constitution had also produced a system which 
was highly legalistic and formalised, leading to conflict over the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court’s authority and casting into doubt the continued existence of arbitration at the Federal 
level. Next, the period after the Second World War was one where governments strengthened 
the economic policy role of the arbitration system while simultaneously promoting flexibility 
in dispute resolution. However the retention of a separate judicial institution, again influenced 
by constitutional constraints, resulted in further conflicts over the system’s authority. Most 
recently, the 1990s have seen a transformation of the arbitration system and a reduced reliance 
on the Constitution’s industrial power. Demands for direct bargaining to replace state 
intervention have produced a fundamental challenge to the vision of conciliation and 
arbitration originally contained in the Constitution.  
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Challenge: The 1920s 
The 1920s saw the Federal arbitration system grow in importance under the influence of a 
developing national trade union movement and an expansive interpretation of the Constitution 
by the High Court. Whereas in 1921 only 22 per cent of all wage changes in Australia were 
made under the Federal arbitration system, by 1929 this proportion had grown to 61 per cent. 
By that stage, about half of all trade unionists (406,000 members) were employed under 
Federal awards.68 The decade also saw the development of a truly national economy and the 
growth of manufacturing industry. The economic, industrial and legal changes brought new 
demands from the Federal Government, unions and employers for the Federal arbitration 
system to act as a national economic regulator. The growth of the Federal system resulted in 
friction with the State industrial systems, while the demand for a new regulatory role 
conflicted with the Court’s adjudicative style of arbitration which it had inherited from 
Higgins and the framers of the Constitution. 
 
The Industrial Peace Act 
The First World War had already placed great strains on the arbitration system, as soaring 
consumer prices fuelled industrial unrest. The Labor Government, led by the Rt Hon. W. M. 
Hughes, responded by seeking to resolve disputes in the interest of prosecuting the war effort. 
Beginning in 1916, both Federal and State governments increasingly resorted to ad hoc
inquiries and tribunals to deal with disputes in key industries. As President of the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court, Justice Higgins was opposed to the use of temporary and 
private tribunals, which he regarded as tending to sacrifice the public interest for the sake of a 
solution convenient to the immediate parties. Apart from doubts over their constitutional 
validity, Higgins viewed such interventions by government as detracting from the principled 
and judicial approach to the settlement of industrial disputes. For his part, Hughes had come 
to believe that informal industry-wide conciliation and bargaining was preferable to the 
legalistic system of arbitration which the Federal jurisdiction had become. In November 1917 
the Prime Minister and the judge clashed publicly over a tribunal constituted under the War 
Precautions Act 1914 to settle a coal mining dispute. Higgins refused to sit as the tribunal 
because it would only have limited powers. He also claimed that Hughes tried to dictate the 
issues to be arbitrated and the outcome to be decided, a claim which Hughes denied.69 
Towards the end of the war Hughes fixed on a new scheme for industrial regulation, using the 
defence power to control key industries through a series of industrial boards with powers to 
set awards, and incorporating the Arbitration Court as a central appellate tribunal. A bill had 
been drafted in 1917 and was discussed with Higgins, who supported the existing system 
supplemented by the State industrial courts.70 It was revived in 1920 following a lengthy 
mining strike and the failure of Hughes’ plans to extend Commonwealth powers by 
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referendum or with the agreement of the States. Relying on an expansive reading of the 
industrial power, the Industrial Peace Act 1920 allowed for special tribunals to be appointed 
by the Government, with the Attorney-General having power to refer specific disputes to them 
for compulsory conference or arbitration.71 The Act also created a network of district and 
national industrial councils for ‘round table’ conciliation.  
Although Hughes presented the special tribunals as adjuncts to the existing arbitration system 
and tried to ensure that there would be no overlap between the two systems, the legislation 
was seen by the Labor Opposition as an unprecedented intrusion by the executive into 
industrial matters, and an erosion of the status of the Arbitration Court. (In fact Hughes 
increased the powers of the Arbitration Court under separate amending legislation).72 Higgins 
regarded the special legislation as an affront to his judicial probity and impartiality: under the 
Act his awards would no longer be final but could be overridden by a special body appointed 
by the Government. Considering that ‘the public usefulness of the Court has been fatally 
injured,’ he announced his resignation on the next sitting day after the legislation was passed, 
gravely declaring that ‘a tribunal of reason cannot do its work side by side with executive 
tribunals of panic.’ 73 The Industrial Peace Act itself was an anti-climax: its reputation as an 
example of exceptional political intervention remained and, apart from being used to create 
four special tribunals for the coalfields in the early 1920s, it remained dormant until it was 
expunged from the statute books in 1950.  
 
The Bruce-Page Amendments 
Hughes’ successor, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, signalled the intention early in his tenure to 
adopt a policy of non-intervention in industrial disputes. To him, direct government 
involvement was not only an improper admixing of political and industrial issues, but an 
inefficient way of proceeding when there was already machinery for the settlement of disputes 
— especially when politically-brokered solutions tended to produce economically unsound 
results.74 After the defeat in 1926 of his referendum to expand the Federal industrial power, 
Bruce became convinced that the States should instead be given primary responsibility for 
industrial matters. His Government’s approach was heavily influenced by a confidential 
report which concluded that the existence of dual jurisdictions for labour regulation was a 
major impediment to industrial efficiency. Although a single national regime was potentially 
more efficient, the sheer volume of detailed regulation required was thought to be simply 
beyond the capacity of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate. The advisory committee 
thus recommended that the Commonwealth should restrict its reach to truly national 
industries.75 
By the mid-1920s the problems of Federal-State dualism had gained a new dimension. A 
change in the personnel and outlook of the High Court meant that Federal legislation and 
22 
awards were increasingly given pre-eminence as reflections of the national interest, overriding 
State awards which were seen as lesser expressions of purely local views. In 1926 the High 
Court held that a Federal award prescribing a 48-hour week prevailed as it was designed to 
cover the whole field of working hours. The power of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court 
to restrain State industrial authorities from dealing with matters before it was also upheld at 
this time76 Thus industries previously governed by State systems were now open to Federal 
regulation, compounding the potential for conflict. 
From the mid-1920s the Commonwealth Arbitration Court began taking on a stronger 
economic planning role, imposing stringencies on wages and conditions in response to 
declining economic performance and rising unemployment.77 A series of strikes then erupted 
in protest at the Court’s awards. The Government reacted by treating the unrest as a crisis in 
the Arbitration Court’s legitimacy, prompting Bruce and the Attorney-General, John Latham, 
to introduce increasingly punitive measures in the name of strengthening law and order under 
arbitration. The trade and commerce power was relied on to insert sections 30J and 30K into 
the Crimes Act in 1926, allowing for criminal prosecution of strikes or boycotts which 
threaten to disrupt trade and commerce with other countries or among the States. The 
Arbitration Act was also amended to strengthen the powers of the Court to enforce its orders, 
while giving the Attorney-General standing to intervene in matters involving standard hours 
or the basic wage.78 
Further amendments were presented late in 1927 by the Attorney-General, Mr Latham. He 
admitted it was not possible for the Federal Parliament to address the whole problem of 
industrial regulation, but while the Commonwealth Arbitration Court remained in place it 
should be adapted and strengthened. Demands had been made on the Government to abolish 
the Court, but this would not mean an end to regulation since the State systems would remain. 
It was necessary ‘to face the realities of the situation,’ when a large number of unionists were 
working under Federal awards. But if those who submitted to the Commonwealth Court  were 
not prepared to abide by its awards, ‘the Government will have to re-consider whether it is 
desirable to maintain the system.’79 
The 1928 amendments were the Government’s last-ditch attempt to strengthen the Federal 
arbitration system, with its heavily judicial approach. The Court’s power to impose penalties 
for strikes and lockouts was strengthened, and employers were empowered to lock out 
employees if the Court declared that they were engaging in a strike. For the first time these 
amendments gave the Court power to regulate internal union affairs, including the ability to 
order a secret ballot of members in cases of industrial action. The Court was also given power 
to punish for contempts made against it.80 A new section required the Court to ‘take into 
consideration the probable economic effect of the agreement or award in relation to the 
community in general and ... upon the industry or industries concerned.’81 The sanctions 
against strikes and the controls over unions led the legislation to be denounced by the ALP as 
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provocative, one-sided and ‘a declaration of war against the organized workers of Australia.’ 
The obligation placed on the Court to consider economic effects was denounced as interfering 
with agreements reached by conciliation, while the measure as a whole was viewed as so 
unfair as to be an abrogation of the principle of conciliation and arbitration. Labor instead 
proposed a system of conciliation boards along the lines of the Industrial Peace Act.82
A series of strikes on the waterfront and aboard ships in 1928 led the Government to 
introduce the Transport Workers Act, using the commerce power to impose a licensing system 
for workers by means of delegated legislation.83 The Act ingeniously allowed particular 
workers to be excluded from the industry if they failed to obtain a license or were refused one: 
because of the licence requirement and its coercive effects the Act was dubbed the ‘dog-collar 
Act’ by waterside workers. Bruce defended the Government’s decision not to conciliate the 
strike by saying that if they had done that ‘it would have taken the first step towards the repeal 
of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and the destruction of the Arbitration Court.’84 He 
warned that if the Court were not obeyed it might as well be abolished.  
Early in 1929 timber workers began a well-supported strike in response to a Federal award by 
Judge Lukin which imposed longer hours and lower pay for many employees in the industry. 
The new legislation was invoked to order a secret ballot. When this was overwhelmingly 
boycotted by the timber workers the Government began prosecuting strikers. A national 
industrial peace conference was called, but failed to reach any policy consensus. The 
Government considered the timber workers’ strike an outbreak of industrial lawlessness, and 
public sympathy for the strikers as a sign of flagging support for the principle of arbitration. 
Bruce increasingly believed that the Federal Government lacked sufficient power to uphold 
the arbitration system by prosecuting disobedient workers. If the system was not being 
enforced it was better to abolish it and leave industrial regulation to the States, which Bruce 
believed had better prospects of imposing order and enforcing decisions. Responding to a 
censure motion in Parliament accusing his Government of introducing ‘class legislation and 
partisan administration,’ Bruce declared: 
We are rapidly coming to the point where we must determine whether our system of 
arbitration is to be continued or whether we shall replace it. If it is to be continued, we 
must recognise that awards must be obeyed, and the prestige and position of the judiciary 
maintained. It is necessary to provide in our legislation, powers that will enable the 
executive government to take action when those who are not prepared to obey the awards 
of the Court are defying the laws of the country, because it is impossible to have upon 
the statute-book legislation which any section of the community may be permitted to 
defy.85 
In May 1929, Bruce issued an ultimatum to the State Premiers: unless they agreed to refer the 
States’ industrial powers to the Commonwealth, he would repeal the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act and leave the field to the States, apart from interstate shipping.86 The 
Premiers’ refusal was then used as the basis for introducing the Maritime Industries Bill, 
which attempted to carry out his threat. Bruce intended abandoning altogether the 
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Commonwealth’s use of the industrial power under the Constitution, relying instead on the 
trade and commerce power. His bill involved creating several Government-appointed 
committees ‘empowered to deal with the regulation of industry in every respect,’ though only 
in connection with terms of employment in the international and interstate transport industries 
because the Commonwealth’s legislative powers over trade and commerce did not extend any 
further. The Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration would be abolished and its 
members transferred to a new Maritime Industries Court which would act as a judicial board 
of review for the committees as well as imposing penalties.87 All other industries would 
become the exclusive preserve of the State industrial authorities. Such a drastic change was 
justified by Bruce because industrial disruption had not diminished despite the amendments 
introduced the previous year.  
The proposal contradicted the Nationalist party policy which still favoured expansion of 
Federal powers. Former Prime Minister W.M. Hughes saw the move as contrary to the trend 
of national progress: 
This measure is without parallel in the legislation of the Commonwealth. For a quarter of 
a century the National Parliament has been building up, stretching out, and consolidating 
its powers. The passing years have seen successive governments vieing with each other 
in an endeavour to exercise more effectively the powers granted to them under the 
Constitution. ... The leaders of all parties, though not always agreeing as to the form of 
the amendments desired, have declared quite definitely that there was a need for wider 
powers to be vested in the Parliament. But while they have regretted the limitations of 
the Constitution, they have not halted nor stumbled in their onward march. They have 
endeavoured to exercise to the utmost all existing power. It has remained to this 
Government to sound the trumpet for a general and shameful retreat from a difficult but 
vitally important strategic position.88 
At the heart of Hughes’ critique was the view that the national system of arbitration was a key 
component of the federal compact. Bruce’s proposal ‘is without parallel in our history; it is 
contrary to the intentions of the framers of the Constitution; it deprives the National 
Parliament of all power to deal with the greatest problem of the age...’89 Hughes insisted that 
as there was no popular mandate for such a drastic change, the Bill should be placed before 
the people by referendum or ballot.  
Bruce’s scheme was sufficiently drastic to rouse opposition from among his own ranks. His 
Government suffered defeat on the floor of the House when Hughes’ motion was supported 
by five other rebels from the Government benches (plus the Speaker, Sir Littleton Groom, 
who abstained from voting). Bruce advised the Governor-General to dissolve the Parliament 
and call an election. The campaign was largely fought over industrial arbitration. Bruce 
defended his move to abolish the Federal system as a final attempt to make industrial control 
simpler and more effective, while Scullin claimed that the Government had made the Federal 
system excessively legalistic and punitive. Although a wide and confusing range of views was 
advanced, the campaign was commonly seen as a plebiscite on the continuation of the Federal 
arbitration system.  
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The election produced a landslide for Labor. While the actual voting swing was moderate 
(about 4 per cent), the Government’s large number of marginal seats meant that Labor won 
fifteen additional places in the seventy-five member House. Bruce and four other Ministers 
were defeated in their own electorates.90 The outcome has been interpreted as the result of a 
gigantic political blunder by Bruce, and a resounding popular vote in support not only of 
Federal arbitration but the method of industrial arbitration generally. While other factors were 
at play, there can be little doubt that the result showed widespread support for the existing 
industrial relations system. 
The incoming Scullin Government thus had good reason to claim a popular mandate for 
retention of Federal arbitration, and proceeded to put forward amendments to make the 
system less adversarial and legalistic. Labor admitted that its reforms were hampered by ‘the 
self-imposed straight-jacket’ placed by the Constitution on the legislative power; 
consequently the Parliament was restricted in its ability to express the people’s will and 
pursue the national interest. The Government aimed to promote co-operation in industrial 
relations by creating a series of conciliation committees chaired by commissioners attached to 
the Court. Because the Bill departed from the judicial model of dispute resolution it was 
blocked by the Opposition-controlled Senate, and a rare conference was held between the 
managers of both Houses. The Government’s original plan to prevent appeals from the 
committees or the commissioners to the Arbitration Court was changed at the insistence of the 
Senate.91 The commissioners were also given statutory appointments and could only be 
suspended from office after a review by both Houses of Parliament. 
The High Court immediately held that the legislation went beyond the industrial power 
because the committees’ deliberations were not limited to settlement of an industrial dispute 
and did not involve any hearing or determination between disputing parties.92 The decision 
effectively meant that binding decisions resulting from industry-based conciliation and ‘round 
table’ negotiation could not be implemented under the industrial power, which was limited to 
judicial-style hearings for the making of compulsory awards and orders. In 1931 the ALP 
Government attempted to overcome the High Court’s objections, introducing legislation 
which extended the arbitral power to conciliation committees, but this move was blocked in 
the Senate as an erosion of the Court’s functions.93 Most of the Scullin Government’s 
amendments were designed to shift the system from a judicial style of arbitration to a more 
informal and accommodative one, but were for this reason negated by the High Court or the 
Senate. Labor’s reforms did, however, result in some reduction of legalism (allowing lawyers 
to appear in court only by consent of all parties) and a greater use of conciliation. By the 
1930s the intersection of popular, parliamentary and judicial forces had tempered the more 
radical changes sought by both sides of politics, confirming the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court’s status as a key component of the Australian system of government.  
 
26 
Reconstruction: 1947-56 
The Second World War, with the threat of invasion by Japan and the need for total 
mobilisation of the nation’s resources in order to achieve victory, led to unprecedented 
demands on the organisation of industry. In 1940 regulations made under the National 
Security Act 1939 expanded the Commonwealth Arbitration Court’s jurisdiction immensely, 
using the defence power under the Constitution to circumvent the restrictions contained in the 
industrial power. The Court was given responsibility for resolving all actual or potential 
disputes, including those within a single State, and empowered to make a common rule for the 
whole industry or to include in its award issues not raised in the original dispute.94 From 1942 
the Labor Government introduced an extensive system of direct planning and regulation of 
key industrial sectors, using the defence power to set up special administrative authorities for 
the waterfront, maritime and coalmining industries. Besides directing production, these bodies 
were also responsible for settling industrial grievances and determining employment 
conditions. In protected occupations, the freedom to change work or engage in industrial 
disputes was drastically curtailed. General regulations were also made which pegged wages 
and set working hours.95 
The end of the war brought new demands on the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for 
greater control over industrial conditions. In 1945 the ACTU Congress called on the Federal 
Labor Government to introduce a national 40-hour week once hostilities had ceased, using the 
external affairs power to implement an ILO Convention by legislation. The Government 
refused, claiming it lacked the constitutional power. Eventually in March 1946 an agreement 
was reached between the Government and the unions to refer the matter to the Arbitration 
Court, using the normal procedure for national wage cases.96 
The Chifley Government sought to continue the wartime system of direct industry regulation  
in key industries, establishing special permanent tribunals in coalmining and on the 
waterfront. A proposed national system for the coal industry based on voluntary co-operation 
was rejected by Treasury official as unstable; a partial solution, applicable only to the New 
South Wales coalfields, was reached in 1946, using joint legislation by the Labor-dominated 
Commonwealth and New South Wales Parliaments.97 In 1947 the Stevedoring Industry 
Commission was re-established using the trade and commerce power. Its arbitral functions 
were transferred back to the Arbitration Court two years later when union representatives 
refused to co-operate with the Commission.98 
The 1947 Changes 
Apart from continuing the special tribunals, the Chifley Government also tried to move the 
Federal arbitration system away from the ornate edifice which the Arbitration Court had 
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become towards a more informal mixed system of boards and court which operated in some 
of the States, and which the Scullin Government had attempted to emulate in 1930 before that 
scheme ran foul of the High Court. However the changes were not as radical as those 
attempted in 1930 and did not seek to deregulate the system by abolishing the Court in favour 
of conciliation committees as the union movement wanted. Labor’s 1947 amendments were 
designed to increase the role of conciliation and collective bargaining, while reducing delay 
and legalism, but they retained centralised regulation by the Court as a crucial element in 
post-war economic planning through its determination of wages and hours.99
The Attorney-General, the Hon. Dr H.V. Evatt, introduced the Bill as ‘a new chapter in the 
history of industrial relations in Australia;’ one which departed from the formalism and 
technical complexity of the existing system by emphasising the prevention of disputes 
through conciliation.100 Whereas conciliation commissioners had played only a minor role 
before the War, now they were to handle most day-to-day functions of resolving disputes and 
making awards. It was expected that they would operate as administrative bodies rather than 
legal tribunals. In keeping with the reduction in legalism, the Court was confined in its role to 
the hearing of purely legal issues and the setting of standards of national importance. The 
reforms marked a much greater reliance on the hitherto little-used prevention power under 
section 51(xxxv). The definition of industrial dispute was widened to include ‘a situation 
which is likely to give rise to a dispute as to industrial matters.’101 
Evatt justified the changes by claiming that the Bill embodied ‘the true spirit of the 
constitutional power of the National Parliament,’ which did not require legalism and 
technicality. But, as the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Menzies, noted, the legal issues which 
constrained the operation of the Federal arbitration system were largely the result of 
constitutional interpretation by the High Court: for good or ill, they could not be touched by 
parliamentary action.102 The Opposition was most concerned at the unfettered discretion given 
to the commissioners, preferring the traditional judicial system of arbitration as productive of 
consistency and respect.  
The new system showed its shortcomings almost immediately. The changes were criticised, 
especially by employers, for reproducing the problems that they had been designed to 
eliminate: the system divided responsibilities irrationally, was unduly inflexible, and lacked 
consistency.103 The division of functions between the Court and the conciliation 
commissioners was especially difficult to determine in practice, leading to lengthy delays and 
court challenges over the Act’s interpretation. In one case, the High Court held that a 
conciliation commissioner was not permitted to insert provision for a tea break into an award 
because this constituted a variation to standard hours under the Act.104 The Menzies 
Government introduced amendments in 1952 which restored appeals from the commissioners 
and allowed cases of special significance to be removed to the Full Court. Apart from these 
problems of co-ordination (which also reflected real differences on the bench regarding wage-
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fixing principles), the historian of the period, Tom Sheridan, has concluded that the 1947 
legislation had little effect on the actual operations of the Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court.105 
The Boilermakers’ Case and the 1956 Amendments 
The rise in industrial militancy after the war led to demands for greater enforcement of 
sanctions, with enforceable penalties for breach of awards or for taking industrial action. 
While the prohibition on strikes had been removed in 1930, the Arbitration Court continued 
to have the power to make an order requiring the observance of any term of an award, and to 
punish breaches of such a term. The 1947 amendments, which expanded this power while at 
the same time enhancing the Court’s power to punish for contempt of court, were widely 
regarded as reimposing by other means the ‘penal powers’ for strikes.  
The issue was tested during conflict over the 1950 Basic Wage Inquiry when metal trades 
unions imposed a ban on the working of overtime contrary to an express provision in the 
award. When the power to enforce this clause was overturned by the High Court, a new 
provision was inserted into the Act by the Menzies Government in 1951 expressly allowing 
the Arbitration Court to make an order requiring an organisation to observe award provisions, 
and providing that failure to observe such an order could be treated as a contempt of court, 
punishable by a heavy fine.106 A bans clause was inserted into the Metal Trades Award in 
1952 and when the Boilermakers’ Society refused to obey an order from the Arbitration Court 
to observe the clause by ceasing a strike, Justice Kirby of the Court fined the union for 
contempt. The union then appealed to the High Court to have the penal power declared 
invalid.  
By a narrow majority the High Court held that the Arbitration Court did not possess the 
necessary judicial power under the Constitution to impose penalties. This decision was later 
confirmed by the Privy Council. The decision echoed previous decisions dating back to 1918 
which declared that only a court properly instituted under the Constitution could exercise the 
judicial power of the Commonwealth. But it went significantly further than this in holding 
that any such court whose primary function was to administer arbitral or legislative powers 
could not also exercise the Commonwealth’s judicial power. Hence the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court could engage in conciliation and arbitration, but it could not also enforce its 
own decisions by imposing penalties, for this was a judicial function which must remain 
institutionally separate.107 
In establishing a demarcation between judicial and other powers, the decision set clear limits 
on the manner in which Parliament could exercise its power to legislate with respect to 
conciliation and arbitration. The Parliament could easily have relied on the existing Federal 
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and State court system to discharge the judicial function, as most other Federal legislation did 
at the time. Instead, the Government decided to create a new court, the Industrial Court, to 
discharge the legal functions of the system especially the imposition of penalties and the 
regulation of industrial organisations.  
In fact it seems that the Government had already decided to overhaul the arbitration system 
before the Boilermakers’ case was decided. By the early 1950s there was widespread 
dissatisfaction with the formalism of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court. The Government 
is reputed to have blamed the legalism and inflexibility on the Chief Judge, Sir Raymond 
Kelly. Appeals from the conciliation commissioners had already been legislated in 1952, 
integrating the system but making the Court even more important. The Government was 
worried by the nation’s unfavourable balance of payments and rising inflation; its solution 
was to increase productivity while cutting purchasing power.108 These measures would most 
likely increase industrial unrest. A review of the system was raised during the December 1955 
election, and at the opening of Parliament the following February the Government announced 
its intention to pursue changes to make the Court more efficient, weeks before the High 
Court’s decision was handed down. The Minister for Labour, the Hon. Harold Holt, preferred 
a more informal approach and raised reform of the Act with the newly-created Labour 
Advisory Council around this time. Holt apparently sounded out Judge Kirby as a possible 
successor to head a less formal body as early as 1954. The Boilermakers’ decision made more 
pressing the need for overhaul of a system which was already showing strain.109 
The 1956 amendments continued the trajectory of the 1947 changes in seeking a reduction in 
legalism and the encouragement of agreements. The existing system would be retained not 
only because it was well-established and accepted, but because an independent tribunal was 
needed to protect the public interest.110 The new Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
was designed to make the handling of disputes more ‘streamlined’ and flexible. The Minister 
hoped that the atmosphere of the Commission would be less formal and that its judges would 
dispense with wigs and gowns (which they did). The Bill was criticised by the Opposition 
because it did not go far enough. In his reply the Leader of the Opposition, Dr Evatt, declared 
that an effective conciliation and arbitration system could only be achieved if Parliament were 
vested with powers over all industrial matters, as well as prices and profits.111 
Coming at a time of intense industrial unrest and rapidly changing conditions (the 40 hours 
case, the 1949 coal strike, inflation and the struggle over margins in the metals industry), the 
statutory changes by both Labor and Liberal governments in the immediate post-war period 
cemented the Federal arbitration tribunal’s role as a maker of economic policy, rather than an 
arbiter of individual disputes. Both measures involved consultation with unions and 
employers before the proposals were presented to Parliament. Under the 1947 amendments 
the Court’s statutory responsibility for basic wage and standard hours inquiries confirmed it as 
an expert body. The Menzies amendments of 1952 and 1956 enhanced this role for the Full 
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Bench by providing it with general co-ordinating responsibility. Its policy role was taken up 
enthusiastically in the highly controversial 1953 Basic Wage Case, which abandoned 
automatic wage increases linked to the cost of living and replaced the needs-based Harvester 
principle with a series of economic indicators designed to determine industry’s capacity to 
pay.  
The post-war amendments represented the most fundamental alteration yet to the structure of 
the Federal arbitration system, but even these changes were in keeping with the traditional 
independent judicial model of arbitration which had emerged from interpretation of the 
Constitution, while allowing the Commission to adopt a more accommodative role towards 
disputant parties.112 The High Court declared the new approach as falling within the 
Parliament’s industrial power: provided the Federal tribunal was acting in settlement of a 
constitutional industrial dispute, ‘it would be absurd to suppose that it was to proceed blindly 
in its work of industrial arbitration and ignore the industrial social and economic 
consequences of what it was invited to do.’113
Consequences of the Reconstructed System 
The Boilermakers’ Case and the 1956 amendments resulted in a bifurcated system, with  
conciliation and arbitration being handled by the Commission, while the new Industrial Court 
determined legal matters of award interpretation and enforcement. The chief defect of this 
system, as it soon emerged, was the lack of co-ordination between the arbitral and judicial 
arms. The Industrial Court operated purely as a court of law without any consideration either 
of the activities of the Commission or the wider consequences of its own decisions. This 
problem came to a head as the result of employers’ increasing use of penal sanctions during 
the 1960s. After the criminal penalty for engaging in a strike was abolished by the Scullin 
Government in 1930, employers began turning to bans clauses as an alternative method of 
enforcement. Once a bans clause was inserted into an award by the Commission, employers 
could obtain an injunction from the Industrial Court ordering observance of the award; if 
disobeyed, a heavy fine was imposed by the Court for contempt. Most of these fines were 
imposed during the ‘absorption battles’ of the 1960s in the metals industry. In December 1967 
the Commission had granted an award increase in the industry but allowed employers to 
absorb the increase in existing over-award payments. When the metals unions began a 
campaign of industrial action demanding payment of the full increase, employer organisations 
retaliated by enforcing the bans clause with the aim of bankrupting the unions. By May 1968 
the metals and engineering unions resolved to refuse to pay any further fines. This policy was 
endorsed by the annual congress of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU).114 
This explosive situation was touched off by a continuing dispute over restructuring of the 
Melbourne transport system, in what became known as the ‘one-man bus’ dispute. The union 
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tried to have the matter resolved in the Commission, but twice the High Court held that there 
was no jurisdiction to hear the dispute as it did not fall within the meaning of the industrial 
power in the Constitution. On the third occasion the Commission’s power was upheld.115 
Besides highlighting the semantic pedantry to which judicial interpretation of the industrial 
power had by this stage descended, the cases exhausted the union’s patience with the legal 
system. A series of fines had already been imposed for breach of injunctions by the Industrial 
Court during the ‘one-man bus’ dispute; the union refused to pay them as it considered it had 
been vindicated by the eventual award. By the time a further penalty was imposed in 1969, the 
union executive resolved not to pay any further fines and withdrew its funds to protect them 
from being confiscated by the Court.  
The matter became a focus of the union movement’s campaign to abolish the ‘penal powers’ 
when the union secretary, Clarrie O’Shea, was summonsed for contempt of the Court. When 
he finally attended the Court on 15 May, he refused to be sworn or answer questions about the 
union’s finances. Judge Kerr thereupon committed O’Shea to prison until he purged his 
contempt.116 As the first gaoling of a union official for 18 years, the sentence was treated as a 
threat to the whole union movement by a court which was widely perceived as having an anti-
labour bias. Widespread stoppages followed within days, but talks to defuse the spreading 
dispute reached a stalemate when the Government insisted that the fines must be paid. The 
crisis was resolved only when the fines were paid by an anonymous individual, thus allowing 
both the Government and the unions to withdraw without backing down. The donor was later 
revealed to be one Dudley MacDougall, who used his recent Opera House lottery winnings to 
pay the fines in a gesture of public beneficence. The episode was widely regarded as 
providing a lesson that punitive sanctions for industrial action were unworkable, since the 
ultimate sanction of gaoling was excessive and a negation of any freedom to take industrial 
action.  
This was a clear occasion when the Parliament served as the focus for debate on a matter of 
vital public concern. Lacking a majority in the Senate, the Government faced intense 
questioning at the height of the crisis when an urgency motion sponsored by the Labor 
Opposition gained the support of the Democratic Labor Party. The Senate Opposition Leader, 
Senator Murphy, attributed the cause of the conflict to the division of functions between the 
Commission and the Court, which derived from the Constitution.117 A similar debate was 
allowed in the House of Representatives two days later. Opposition members repeatedly 
pointed to the one-sidedness of the penal sanctions, and the Industrial Court’s refusal to 
examine the rights or wrongs of industrial action before imposing a penalty.  
While the Government continued to assert that effective sanctions were an essential feature of 
the arbitration system, it resumed negotiations with the union movement on modifications to 
the enforcement provisions.118 An agreement was also reached with the ACTU and 
employers’ associations on the use of dispute resolution procedures. With the growth of 
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informal collective bargaining, the power of the Parliament and the Commission to control 
the industrial relations climate were increasingly being eclipsed. The following year the 
Government introduced amendments designed to make the use of sanctions a last resort, 
admitting that the existing process was ‘no longer appropriate or desirable’ and that where 
possible disputes should be resolved without recourse to penalties.119 Recognising the 
shortcomings of a purely legal tribunal in dealing with industrial disputes, the amendments 
clearly reasserted the primacy of conciliation and arbitration. The trend towards facilitation of 
dispute resolution was continued in the McMahon Government’s major revision of the Act in 
1972.  
The accession of the Whitlam Labor Government in December 1972 gave the ALP its first 
opportunity at reform of industrial relations legislation since 1947. The Minister for Labour, 
Mr Cameron, introduced a bill in April 1973, which he described as ‘the first stage of a 
radical transformation of industrial relations in Australia.’120 A major aim of the changes was 
to shift the system away from court proceedings and penalties in favour of bargaining and 
conciliation. The Minister noted that in the longer term the Government aimed to implement 
the Labor party’s commitment to constitutional reform by seeking an expansion of the Federal 
legislative domain:  
It is the task of the national Parliament to create labour relations which meet and match 
the needs of the community and which will anticipate and overcome obstacles to justice 
and common sense in industrial relations.121 
While the Government presented the amendments as a way of saving the arbitration system by 
accommodating it to change, the Opposition saw these moves as destroying the authority of 
the Commission and the effectiveness of the legislative framework under which it operated. 
When the Bill reached the Senate, the Opposition and Democratic Labor Party members 
combined to prevent detailed consideration beyond the second reading stage. Some of the 
changes to the machinery of the Commission and Court were, however, passed later that 
year.122 Faced with a hostile Senate, Labor was unable to proceed with its more extensive 
proposals. Attempts to gain expanded legislative power through constitutional change also 
proved abortive in the 1973 referendum which failed to gain approval for Federal control over 
prices and incomes when the ACTU, fearful that it would be used to freeze wages, 
campaigned against the proposal. 
 
Transformation: 1985-96 
The period of Liberal-National party government from 1976-83 saw a strengthened role for 
the Arbitration Commission. Industrial relations became more centralised and award 
regulation gained greater prominence as national wage cases took on a major role in the 
Government’s attempts to contain inflation by limiting wage increases. The Commission 
acquiesced in this role by adopting the mechanism of partial wage indexation which passed on 
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only part of the rising cost of living in award increases. A key part of the Government’s 
strategy was the containment of industrial action through strengthened legal sanctions and 
enforcement mechanisms.123 Additional sanctions for industrial action were introduced, 
notably the prohibition of secondary boycotts under the 1977 amendments to the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, using the trade and commerce power of the Constitution. The Opposition 
criticised this innovation as an inappropriate use of competition law, implicitly taking the 
view that only the industrial power should be used to regulate industrial relations.124 
This period was also marked by an increase in direct intervention by government in industrial 
relations as legislation was passed which either limited the discretion of the Commission or 
gave new legal powers to employers.125 A further proposal made in 1982 would have allowed 
employers to stand-down employees as a result of industrial action without any power of 
supervision by the Commission. The clause was criticised by the Labor Opposition as ‘an 
imposition from outside the system.’ When it came before the Senate, the change was 
opposed by the Australian Democrats in conjunction with the ALP; after being referred to a 
select committee the Bill eventually lapsed.126 
By contrast the ALP took power in March 1983 with a strategy heavily reliant on its Accord 
on economic policy which it had concluded with the ACTU. This was premissed on a 
centralised system of wage fixation under the Arbitration Commission, and its 
implementation depended on the adoption of its principles by the Commission in national 
wage cases. The High Court’s approach in the Social Welfare Union Case (June 1983) and 
subsequent decisions allowed this to occur. By treating the meaning of the words ‘industrial 
dispute’ in section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution as largely a question of fact and ordinary 
meaning, the Court allowed the Commission unprecedented discretion to determine which 
matters it could include in an award, while also expanding the range of workers who could be 
covered by the Federal arbitration system.127 
The Hancock Report and the Industrial Relations Act 
The original Accord contained a commitment to the establishment of an inquiry ‘to conduct a 
total review of Federal industrial legislation.’128 In July 1983 such a committee of review was 
announced. It was tripartite and extra-Parliamentary in nature, consisting of Professor Keith 
Hancock (an academic economist) as chairman, together with Mr Charlie Fitzgibbon (former 
Senior Vice-President of the ACTU) and Mr George Polites (former Director-General of the 
Confederation of Australian Industry, the peak employer association). The Committee’s terms 
of reference had a distinct legal and constitutional focus. The report was handed down in 
April 1985 after the Committee had received substantial submissions from all major 
representatives of employers, unions and government. 
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The Committee took the essentially conservative approach that, since it was difficult to 
achieve change across an industrial relations system, reform ‘should only be attempted if there 
is reasonable ground for the expectation that present problems will thereby be overcome and 
that different and worse problems will not be created.’129 In the end, the Committee was not 
persuaded that ‘definite and decisive advantages’ would flow from any major change. The 
proponents of fundamental deregulation had assumed rather than demonstrated its claimed 
benefits, while the existing system had proved itself to be sufficiently adaptable to 
accommodate new policies and practices. A system of conciliation and arbitration was the one 
most capable of developing and implementing a centralised wage policy in the national 
interest. Considering the long history of the present system, the widespread public support 
which it had engendered, and the complexities of changing an overall system which was 
spread across Federal and State domains, any major change would face difficulties and 
uncertainty.130 
Special emphasis was placed on the Commission’s status as an independent and expert body 
which proceeded by public argument and deliberation: these characteristics gave it the 
flexibility to adapt its principles and processes to a changing economic and industrial climate, 
to maintain public confidence, and to accommodate the needs of the parties.131 While it 
accepted that the Commission should take account of the public interest and the economic 
consequences of its decisions, the Hancock Committee was opposed to any closer direction by 
Parliament, especially: 
measures which would involve intrusion by the legislature directly on the Commission in 
exercising its dispute-settling function. To do so, would, we believe, cast doubts upon 
the independence of the Commission. The tribunal’s independence is essential for it to 
operate effectively and with the continued confidence of the community and the parties 
who rely upon it for the resolution of disputes.132 
The Report’s main recommendations concerned the restructuring of the Federal institutions. 
The Committee emphasised the continuing central role for an arbitral tribunal, but thought its 
name should be changed to the Australian Industrial Relations Commission to reflect its 
broader role ‘in consultative processes, in the consideration of the public interest, and in the 
promotion of industrial harmony.’ A separate Australian Labour Court should also be created, 
the members of which would hold concurrent office as presidential members of the 
Commission. The integration of arbitral and judicial functions by the sharing of personnel 
would result in ‘a more practical and streamlined’ system while avoiding the restrictions 
imposed by the Boilermakers’ Case.133 
While largely based on the Hancock Report, the Industrial Relations Bill introduced in May 
1987 made some significant departures from its recommendations. In the words of the 
Minister for Industrial Relations, the Hon. Ralph Willis, the Bill represented an ‘evolutionary 
development’ of the existing system, one which retained the centrality of conciliation and 
arbitration ‘based on a clear understanding of the social, historical and structural 
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characteristics of our industrial relations system as it has evolved over the past 80 years.’134 
The Commonwealth Government had been unable to secure the States’ commitment to setting 
up a unified system, so the Bill was confined to providing for joint appointments to State and 
Federal tribunals.  
It was in the sanctions provided against industrial action that the Bill contained its most 
significant innovation. The Government believed that all remedies and penalties for industrial 
action should be located in the specialised labour law system, rather than derived from a 
variety of common law and statutory sources. The Bill proposed that the new Labour Court 
would have primary responsibility for orders to cease industrial action, including the statutory 
remedies for secondary boycotts under the Trade Practices Act as well as new powers to issue 
injunctions and impose fines for non-observance of Commission orders.135 These provisions 
drew such strong objections from employer organisations as to lead to the Bill’s demise. 
When the Government decided to call a snap election for July 1987, the Bill was delayed and 
the enforcement provisions dropped in order to neutralise a threat by business groups to 
campaign against the changes. Government members claimed that the amendments had been 
misrepresented, especially those concerning sanctions, and that the community needed more 
time to understand them.136 When Parliament resumed after Labor’s re-election, the 
Government announced that, as the result of extensive consultations, its reforms would be 
reintroduced ‘without changing existing sanction provisions.’ The Government also decided 
not to go ahead with the establishment of a specialist Labour Court, since it was no longer 
needed to administer sanctions.137 The revised Bill was pushed through the House on 23 May, 
passing through all stages with minimal scrutiny. 
When it reached the Senate, the Opposition criticised the Bill for maintaining the ‘heavily 
controlled, centralised and essentially bureaucratic procedures’ of the existing system. It put 
forward an extensive series of amendments based on the Coalition’s recently adopted policy 
favouring ‘single enterprise bargaining units’ designed to enable employers and employees ‘to 
resolve their differences by direct agreement.’138 For the first time since the 1929-31 proposals 
there was fundamental disagreement between the major parties concerning the form and 
processes of the Federal industrial relations system. The Opposition also proposed additional 
sanctions against strikes, effectively reviving the pre-1970 powers by allowing the Federal 
Court to issue an injunction enforcing the Commission’s order to cease industrial action. In 
response, the Government argued that such an approach would reproduce the problems 
highlighted by the 1960s controversy over the enforcement of bans clauses, culminating in the 
O’Shea case.139 After extensive debate the Government’s scheme prevailed with the support 
of the Australian Democrats. The Industrial Relations Act which resulted was therefore little 
more than a reordering of the existing system. 
While the Hancock Report had envisaged the Commission continuing to play a strong central 
role in the implementation of economic policy, the climate had changed by the late 1980s. 
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From 1986, under a renegotiated Accord between the Federal Government and the ACTU, 
centralised regulation began to be replaced by a decentralised approach as the focus of change 
shifted towards the workplace.140 However the Commission continued to determine the 
parameters of wage increases based on productivity changes, and to operate a fully centralised 
approach to the award of base-level wage increases linked to the cost of living. Union leaders 
became increasingly dissatisfied with the results of the Accord process, and sought to 
circumvent the Commission’s central power by resort to collective bargaining.141 
Change in the 1990s 
The later years of the Labor Government, from 1991-96, have been described as a period of 
‘co-ordinated flexibility’ in industrial relations, when a shift towards enterprise-based 
collective bargaining was achieved within the framework of the award system.142 Pressure 
from the ACTU and employers for greater autonomy was initially resisted by the Commission 
in April 1991. Concerned that deregulated bargaining would lead to excessive claims and 
disputes, the Commission declared that the parties still needed to develop ‘maturity’ so that 
some consensus could be reached on the nature of the new bargaining system.143 When the 
Federal Government announced that it would introduce amendments designed to facilitate a 
shift towards enterprise bargaining, the Commission was forced to accept greater 
deregulation. In its October 1991 wage decision it announced that in future the Commission 
would endorse enterprise agreements provided they implemented its principles for improving 
efficiency. As part of its new supervisory role, the Commission declared that from now on it 
would refrain from using arbitral powers to resolve disputes over the conduct of bargaining, 
leaving such issues to conciliation or to negotiation between the parties.144 
The legislative changes introduced in 1992 and 1993 were designed to formalise this shift to a 
system based on enterprise-focussed bargaining. While the Commission continued to oversee 
the process, its independent discretion was diminished. In the majority of cases (where only a 
single enterprise was involved), it could no longer refuse to certify an agreement on the 
ground that it was ‘contrary to the public interest.’ However the Commission still retained an 
important role in the approval process: an agreement could only be certified if the 
Commission was satisfied that its overall terms did not disadvantage employees by 
comparison with the award.145 Under the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, the 
Commission was also subjected to greater legislative direction when making awards, which 
by now had completely lost (other than in purely formal terms) their original function as the 
settlement of an industrial dispute. Awards were now to ‘act as a safety net of minimum 
wages and conditions of employment underpinning direct bargaining,’ rather than a 
prescription of actual entitlements.146 While the Commission retained a central position as an 
arbiter of general standards and a gateway for approving particular agreements, it is clear that 
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these changes significantly displaced its traditional role as an independent judicial tribunal 
resolving disputes.147 The validity of this focus on bargaining was confirmed in 1996 when the 
High Court held that legislation allowing parties involved in an industrial dispute to settle 
their differences by making an agreement was an exercise of the incidental aspect of the 
industrial power under section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution.148
The Reform Act was also constitutionally significant in its reliance on alternative heads 
powers, such as the corporations and external affairs powers. One of the terms of the 
renegotiated Accord in 1992 between the ACTU and the ALP Government, implemented in 
the 1993 Reform Act, was the introduction of a range of minimum employment standards 
covering minimum wages, equal remuneration, parental leave, unfair dismissal and protection 
for industrial action during bargaining negotiations. Decisions of the High Court in the 1980s 
had already confirmed that the external affairs power could support a broad range of 
legislative initiatives.149 So that the labour standards would apply to all employees in Australia 
(including employees in Victoria, which had recently abolished its industrial arbitration 
system), they were enacted using the external affairs power. In this respect the legislation was 
the most dramatic example of direct regulation by the Federal Parliament in the field of 
industrial relations since Federation. Yet the Commission retained significant responsibilities 
for determining the details and application of the minimum standards.  
So significant was the Reform Act’s reliance on international labour standards that it has been 
described as ushering in ‘the internationalisation of Australian industrial law.’150 The use of 
the external affairs power in this way was condemned by the Opposition as undermining the 
constitutional balance, presumably since it allowed the Federal Parliament to legislate on 
employment matters often previously considered the preserve of the States.151 Despite the 
novelty of Federal intervention in many areas, the High Court did not consider this to be a 
constitutional impediment to the validity of the Reform Act. Most of the Act’s controversial 
provisions were held to be supported by the external affairs power since they could reasonably 
be considered appropriate and adapted to the implementation of international conventions.152 
The enterprise bargaining provisions of the Industrial Relations Reform Act were also partly 
underpinned by the corporations power. The aim of using the corporations power was to 
avoid the constitutional restrictions imposed by the industrial power, allowing non-unionists 
to participate in enterprise bargaining by allowing agreements to be made directly between an 
incorporated employer and its employees.153 While the scope for bargaining was thus 
expanded by the Reform Act, it still remained integrated within the existing industrial 
relations system: both types of agreement had to be certified by the Commission, satisfying a 
‘no disadvantage’ test when compared with an existing Federal award. Thus only employees 
already covered by a Federal award could become parties to an enterprise flexibility 
agreement; a requirement which was also justified by the Minister for Industrial Relations, Mr 
Brereton, in order ‘to avoid intrusion into the State jurisdictions.’154 
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Thus in the early 1990s the ALP in government had moved towards a more deregulated 
system, using a variety of constitutional powers while retaining a role for the Commission in 
adjudicating claims and implementing policy.  
By contrast its political opponents had moved away from third-party intervention altogether. 
In the late 1980s Liberal party policy abandoned the traditional conservative faith in a strong 
arbitration system and increasingly favoured deregulated individual bargaining. The Liberal-
National Coalition Government introduced its reforms less than three months after gaining 
power at the March 1996 election. The Workplace Relations and Other Legislation 
Amendment Bill made fundamental changes to the existing legislation, including a change of 
its name to the Workplace Relations Act. This and other amendments were indicative of a 
complete transformation, one which minimised the Commission’s role in third-party dispute 
resolution and limited its regulatory function. The Minister for Workplace Relations, the Hon. 
Peter Reith, described the Bill as a break with the conflict and paternalism of the existing 
system of industrial relations by shifting the focus to employers and employees at the 
workplace level.155 Many of the key features of the Bill had already been presented in the 
Coalition’s critique of the 1988 Act: enterprise-based bargaining with minimal involvement 
of the Commission, restricted intervention by unions in the direct bargaining process, freedom 
of association notably the right of non-membership, and more effective sanctions for 
industrial action including court injunctions.  
Under these changes, the role of the Commission was changed dramatically. The 
Commission’s arbitral powers were now to be exercised ‘as a last resort’ rather than ‘where 
necessary,’ and would normally be limited to a list of specified ‘allowable award matters’ 
which would provide a ‘safety net’ of core standards underpinning more comprehensive 
regulation by agreement. Beyond this, the Commission was prevented from making binding 
determinations unless bargaining had broken down and threatened to cause harm to the 
economy or the community. The power of the Federal Commission was also limited if a 
matter was already being addressed by a  State tribunal.156 The Bill also introduced Australian 
Workplace Agreements (AWAs), a new form of industrial instrument concluded on an 
individual basis between an employer and an employee. The Commission would also have no 
jurisdiction over AWAs, which would come into force simply by being lodged with the 
Employment Advocate, a new statutory office subject to ministerial direction. It was 
originally envisaged that all kinds of agreements would be expected to satisfy a series of 
minimum conditions prescribed directly by the legislation, instead of the ‘no disadvantage’ 
test by which the Commission compared the total terms of prospective agreements to those 
prevailing under existing awards. The statutory minima proposed under the Bill included 
well-established leave entitlements, and relied on wage rates set under relevant awards of 
either the Australian Industrial Relations Commission or a State industrial authority.157 
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The Australian Democrats had already indicated their reservations over several aspects of the 
Bill, which was referred to the Economics References Committee as soon as it reached the 
Senate. With the major parties implacably divided, the supplementary report by Democrats 
Senator Andrew Murray proved decisive. The Democrats believed that employees should 
have access to the Commission as an ‘independent umpire.’ Where parties could not agree on 
the form of regulation to apply, employees should have ‘the protection of an adequate award, 
buttressed by compulsory arbitration.’158 The Democrats insisted that the Commission should 
retain the power to arbitrate and make an award beyond the allowable award matters ‘where 
agreement cannot be reached and resolution of the mater by arbitration would be in the public 
interest.159 It was also recommended that agreements be judged using a no disadvantage test 
by comparison with award entitlements, rather than the proposed list of statutory minimum 
conditions. 
After protracted negotiations between the Minister, Mr Reith, and the leader of the Australian 
Democrats, Senator Kernot, an agreement was reached on amendments acceptable to both 
parties which would allow the Bill to pass.160 While the Minister claimed that the changes 
retained the ‘basic integrity’ of his proposals, the amended Bill made significant concessions 
towards retention of the Commission’s independent role in a reduced form. Significantly the 
compromise was reached outside the normal parliamentary process and the jointly-sponsored 
amendments passed through the Senate without further changes. In the process the 
Commission’s role was retained though recast: henceforth it would determine reasonable 
minimum conditions, facilitate agreements and judge their fairness, but would be called on to 
fully arbitrate disputes only in exceptional or intractable situations. Further attempted 
amendments introduced in 1999 were aimed largely at abolishing many of the compromises 
made during the passage of the Workplace Relations Act. These proposals were withdrawn 
after they were rejected by the Democrats on the grounds that the recent legislative changes 
had not been shown to be defective and that further change should be evolutionary in 
nature.161 
Under the Workplace Relations Act the Parliament has engaged in unprecedented direct 
intervention by circumscribing the range of issues which can be addressed by the Commission 
when arbitrating an industrial dispute, limiting it to a list of allowable award matters. While 
validated by the High Court, this amendment was strongly criticised by Justice Kirby who 
described this approach as departing from ‘nearly a century of previously unbroken 
constitutional authority’ by allowing Parliament to change the solution reached in an award, 
and thus producing ‘a radical enlargement of the Federal legislative power under section 
51(xxxv).’162 Even here, though, the legislation is not completely prescriptive and reserves 
some discretion to the Commission to arbitrate on a future matter if satisfied that it is 
exceptional, will not be resolved by conciliation and would result in a harsh or unjust 
outcome if not included in an award.163 
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Most recently, Mr Reith flagged a proposal to replace the use of the industrial power with a 
widespread reliance on the corporations power. At an address to the National Press Club in 
March 1999, he described the corporations power as being able to discard ‘in one legislative 
act the complexity and cost created by paper disputes, ambit logs of claim, dispute findings, 
notional interstateness, competing award respondency and dual registration.’164 The use of the 
corporations power would not limit Federal legislation in the processes used; conciliation and 
arbitration might still be available but would not be a mandatory aspect of the system. The 
appeal of the corporations power was more than a matter of convenience: it carried a message 
that the system would no longer focus on unions and state-created tribunals. 
 
The Vision in Hindsight 
Despite its limitations, the Commonwealth Parliament has continued to rely extensively on 
the industrial power over the past century, making limited use of other constitutional powers. 
Even when other powers have been used, the tendency has been to adopt a system based on 
independent arbitration of industrial claims. The direct regulation of key industries during the 
Second World War was dismantled in the 1950s and indirect regulation through the 
arbitration system has until recently remained the norm. Adherence to the arbitral model 
provided a high degree of institutional and procedural stability but with restricted flexibility. 
This focus on conciliation and arbitration has been due not to inertia but to the vision 
contained in the industrial power itself. As Justice Michael Kirby has put it, the advent of 
arbitration: 
was in part, out of conviction that the court analogy could provide a just solution to the 
disputes between employer and employee which had plagued earlier colonial times. It 
was in part, out of the perceived incapacity of the other heads of power to provide a more 
direct means for Federal regulation. It was in part, the result of the view that here was a 
provision specifically enacted as the charter for Federal legislation in industrial relations 
— not by direct legislative control but through a tribunal intermediary set up to 
discharge the functions of conciliation and arbitration....165 
Throughout nearly the whole past century, industrial relations policy has been measured and 
marked by a persistent adherence by governments to an ideal of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration, a scheme seen as embodied in the Constitution and taken to be embedded deeply 
in the national sentiment as a ‘fair go.’ In its popular phrase, this ideal has been regarded as 
the right of employees, especially the most needy and powerless, to have ready access to an 
independent umpire for the settlement of their claims and grievances. That umpire, moreover, 
would decide the issues in a spirit of judicious fairness and generosity according to 
generalised notions of equity and the merits of the case, as represented in such diffuse 
concepts as industrial justice and a ‘fair and reasonable’ living wage. Only in recent years 
have attempts been made to replace this approach with potentially more direct forms of 
legislative regulation using the external affairs and corporations powers. The use of such 
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powers indicates a decline in confidence by governments in the value of the arbitration 
tribunal’s autonomy and expertise. 
This is not to say that industrial relations policy has been bipartisan throughout the period, or 
that the elements of section 51(xxxv) have been met with unswerving adherence. In fact, the 
boundaries and many of the constituent elements of compulsory arbitration have remained the 
subject of political controversy ever since its establishment. Attitudes to proposals for 
legislative change have tended to divide predictably along party lines, which has limited the 
degree of success of reforms. A recent study by Fox and Pittard has shown that of the 95 
industrial relations bills introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament since 1956, one-third 
have failed to pass into law. While most proposals have met with strong political 
disagreement, there has been common support for retaining an independent arbitration 
tribunal. Just over half the proposed amendments have dealt with arbitration, awards and the 
tribunal structure.166 Debate on industrial relations reform has generally been well-informed, 
particularly in the Senate where close scrutiny of government proposals resulted in significant 
concessions in 1930-31, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 1996. Sustained criticism of government 
policy also took place in the Upper House in 1969-72 and again in 1988. Of course the 
clearest example of parliamentary supremacy occurred in 1929 when the Bruce-Page 
government lost power over its attempt to abandon the industrial power. 
Industrial relations policy has tended to be seen as a political rather than a technical matter, 
with frequent debate focussed in Parliament. Instead of relying on independent commissions 
of inquiry, governments have usually resorted to informal consultation with peak 
organisations representing unions and employers, as well as the Commission itself, or through 
more formal tripartite mechanisms such as the National Labour Consultative Council.167 
Official inquiries were used particularly during the restructuring of industrial relations in the 
coal and maritime industries during 1947-56, and in the review by the Hancock Committee in 
the 1980s. More often, changes to Federal industrial legislation have been the result of 
formulated party policy. Even when inquiries have been used, they have not tended to 
question the fundamental basis for state regulation but have been limited to finding more 
rational and efficient mechanisms for achieving such regulation, and for dealing with the 
division between Federal and State powers.  
This picture changed in the 1990s when most industrial relations legislation was referred to 
Senate committees for scrutiny. Largely due to the increased position of minor parties 
(combined with the more contentious nature of the changes proposed), there were seven such 
referrals to Senate committees during the 1990s, compared with only one in the 1980s and 
none in the 1970s. Since 1996 the use of Senate committees to analyse the impact of 
legislative changes has become routine.168 Such committees are able to draw on expert 
submissions and evidence, as well as gaining the opinions of unions and employer 
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associations. They have thus provided a more open substitute for the tripartite consultative 
mechanisms which were abolished by the Liberal-National Government. 
There are several reasons why the industrial power is likely to retain its primary significance. 
Most of the reasons given over the years for retention of the arbitration system still have 
force. The division of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and the States is a 
powerful source of inertia favouring the retention of arbitration. While the Commonwealth 
could conceivably arrogate to itself full responsibility for employment matters by the use of 
alternative constitutional powers, such a move would meet strong political hostility in defence 
of federalism and States’ rights. In any case, there would still remain some areas of 
employment regulation not covered by federal power and which would need to be filled by 
State legislation. The broad interpretation given to the industrial power by the High Court 
since the 1980s has reduced most of the former obstacles limiting the federal arbitration 
jurisdiction, although it still remains a complex and technical matter to institute proceedings. 
Although other constitutional powers, particularly the corporations power, have recently 
attracted enthusiasm from several quarters, they still lack comprehensiveness. The 
corporations power does not cover unincorporated employers and its limits in the employment 
area are untested, while the external affairs power is limited in subject-matter to the terms of 
ILO standards. Such powers will however continue to be used as valuable supplementations 
to the industrial power, as in the legislation of 1993 and 1996.169 
Indirect regulation through an independent tribunal remains a useful means of delegating 
power and responsibility, and an effective way to limit the politicisation of industrial relations 
issues. It is also unlikely that government will totally abrogate the economic policy and 
regulatory functions of the Commission, although the dispute resolution role may decline 
further under the decentralised bargaining regime. Besides this, it does seem that arbitration 
as an institution still has a large measure of popular legitimacy as well as political support. 
The progress of the 1996 legislation suggests that any major legislative proposal, if it is to 
succeed, will need to retain an independent arbitral body to set minimum conditions, oversee 
fairness in bargaining and settle more serious disputes. In those respects the original vision of 
Kingston, Higgins and Deakin continues to exert influence. 
 
Endnotes 
43 
1 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, 2 March to 9 April 
1891, Government Printer, Sydney, 1891, p. 688. 
2 South Australian Parliamentary Debates, 17 December 1890, col. 2507-9; New South Wales 
Royal Commission on Strikes, Report, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, Government 
Printer, Sydney, 1891, Minutes of Evidence pp. 233-9, Conciliation Appendix pp. 71-5; 
Richard Mitchell, ‘State systems of Conciliation and Arbitration: the Legal Origins of the 
Australasian Model’, in Stuart Macintyre and Richard Mitchell, eds, Foundations of 
Arbitration: The Origins and Effects of State Compulsory Arbitration,1890-1914, Oxford U.P., 
Melbourne, 1989; Andrew Frazer, Law and Industrial Arbitration in New South Wales, 1890-
1912, PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1990, pp. 91-4.  
3 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney, op. cit., pp. 781-5. 
4 Frazer, Law and Industrial Arbitration in New South Wales, op. cit., pp. 57-76, 100-101, 114-6; 
P.G. Macarthy, ‘Victorian Wages Boards: their Origin and the Doctrine of the Living Wage’, 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 10, 1968, pp. 116-32; Raelene Francis, The Politics of 
Work: Gender and Labour in Victoria 1880-1939, Cambridge U.P., 1993. 
5 John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1901, p. 646. 
6 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, March 22 to May 
5, 1897, Government Printer, Adelaide, 1897, p. 782. 
7 Ibid., pp. 782, 791. 
8 Ibid., p. 792. 
9 Official Record of the Debates of the Australasian Federal Convention, Third Session, 
Melbourne, 20th January to 17th March 1898, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1898, vol. 1, 
pp. 181, 186, 203, 213. 
10 Ibid., p. 208. 
11 Ibid., pp. 203, 213. 
12 Ibid., p. 210; J.A. La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution, Melbourne U.P., 1972, 
p. 208. Forrest introduced compulsory arbitration legislation to his own colony in 1900 in order 
to gain political support: N. F. Dufty, ‘The Genesis of Arbitration in Western Australia’, 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 28, 1986, pp. 545-63. 
13 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 58, p. 4810 (19 October 1910). 
14 Daily Telegraph, 18 January 1901; R. Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth: Australian 
Federation: Expectations and Fulfilment 1889-1910, Melbourne U.P., 1975, pp. 66-7.  
15 A recent biography argues that Kingston resigned for personal and family health reasons: 
Margaret Glass, Charles Cameron Kingston: Federation Father, Melbourne U.P., 1997, pp. 
218-9. 
16 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 15, pp. 2859-60, 2880 (30 July 1903). 
17 Ibid., p. 2863. It was commonly thought at the time that the Act would set minimum wages 
directly: see Deakin, ibid., vol. 18, p. 764 (22 March 1904). 
18 Deakin, ibid., p. 2870 (30 July 1903). 
 
44 
19 Ibid., vol. 16, p. 4788 (8 September 1903); ibid., p. 4838 (9 September 1903); Norris, Emergent 
Commonwealth, op. cit., pp. 189-190. Deakin’s concerns over the inclusion of State 
government railway workers were later vindicated when the High Court struck down this 
aspect of the eventual Act: Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway 
Service Association v. N.S.W. Railway Traffic Employees’ Association (Railway Servants Case) 
(1906) 4 CLR 488. 
20 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 19, p. 1244 (21 April 1904). 
21 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 21, p. 4029; Sawer, Australian Federal Politics 
and Law 1901-1929, op. cit., p. 38.   
22 G.H. Reid, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 15, p. 3190 (6 August 1903). 
23 Mr Glynn, ibid., vol. 18, p. 888 (13 April 1904); Mr Dugald Thompson, ibid., p. 906; G.B. 
Edwards, ibid., p. 1018 (14 April 1904). 
24 D.H. Plowman, Holding the Line: Compulsory Arbitration and National Employer Co-
Ordination in Australia, Cambridge U.P., Melbourne, 1989, pp. 11-22; D. Plowman and G. 
Smith, ‘Moulding Federal Arbitration: the Employers and the High Court, 1903-1935’, 
Australian Journal of Management, vol. 12, 1986, pp. 203-229. 
25 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 2, pp. 1819-27 (28 June 1901); ibid., vol. 4, p. 
4296 (29 Aug 1901); Norris, Emergent Commonwealth, op. cit., p. 191; John Rickard, H.B. 
Higgins: The Rebel as Judge, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 129.  
26 Ex p. H.V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1; P.G. Macarthy, ‘Justice Higgins and the Harvester 
Judgment’, Australian Economic History Review, vol. 9, 1969, pp. 17-38. 
27 The King v. Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41. 
28 Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929, op. cit., pp. 83-4. 
29 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 41, p. 5780 (8 November 1907); ibid., vol. 44, p. 
8994 (13 March 1908); ibid., vol. 52, p. 11382 (22 May 1908). The Harvester principle was 
followed in Marine Cooks, Bakers and Butchers’ Association of Australia v. Commonwealth 
Steam-Ship Owners’ Association (1908) 2 CAR 55 at 60; Barrier Branch of the Amalgamated 
Miners’ Association v. Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (1909) 3 CAR 1 at 21; Australian 
Boot Trade Employees’ Federation v. Whybrow and Co. (1910) 4 CAR 1 at 10; see also Henry 
Bournes Higgins, A New Province For Law and Order, Constable, London, 1922, pp. 5-7. 
30 P.M. McGlynn (August 1909), ‘Memorandum Relating to (I) the Australian Industries 
Preservation Act, and (II) the Industrial Power: Together with Suggestions for the Amendment 
of the Constitution in Relation to Trusts and Industrial Matters’, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Papers, 1910, vol. 3. 
31 J.H. Catts, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 58, p. 4833 (19 October 1910); Royal 
Commission on the Constitution, Report, Government Printer, Canberra, 1929, p. 182. 
32 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1903, p. 13. 
33 Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v. Whybrow and Co. (1910) 4 CAR 1 at 42. 
34 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-10 (Cwlth), s. 4, amended by 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1910 (Cwlth), s.2(b); Margaret Lee, The 
Industrial Peace Act, 1920: A Study of Political Interference in Compulsory Arbitration, MEc 
Thesis, University of Sydney, 1980, p. 63. The validity of the extended meaning of ‘industrial 
 
45 
dispute’ was upheld in Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. Newcastle and Hunter River 
Steamship Co Ltd  (No 1) (1913) 16 CLR 591.  
35 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 56, pp. 4697, 4708 (18 October 1910). On Labor 
attitudes to the High Court, see also Senator Rae, ibid., vol. 55, p. 304 (13 July 1910). 
36 L.F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes: A Political Biography; vol. 1, That Fiery Particle,
Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1964, p. 258. 
37 Sir John Quick, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, p. 4932 (20 October 1910); A. 
Deakin, ibid., vol. 58, pp. 4812, 4825 (19 October 1910). 
38 Conrad Joyner, Holman versus Hughes: Extension of Australian Commonwealth Powers, 
University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1961, p. 28; H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader: 
The Story of W.A. Holman and the Labour Movement, 2nd edn, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 
1942, pp. 264-5. 
39 W.M. Hughes, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 68, pp. 5687, 5693 (20 November 
1912); Mr Archibald, ibid., p. 5719; W.G. Spence, ibid., pp. 5732-3.. 
40 Scott Bennett and Sean Brennan, Constitutional Referenda in Australia, Research Paper 2, 
1999-2000, Department of Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 1999, fn 10. 
41 W.M. Hughes, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 77, p. 4256 (23 Jun 1915); Senator 
Mullen, ibid., vol. 79, p. 7459 (11 November 1915); Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, op. cit., 
p. 368; Farey v. Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433 (power to fix price of bread); Joyner, Holman 
versus Hughes, op. cit., pp. 49-51. 
42 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 90, pp. 12846-7 (1 October 1919). The 
parliamentary Labor party opposed this method, claiming that it was inadequate and conflicted 
with the party’s aim of seeking permanent expansion of Federal powers.  
43 W. M. Hughes, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 98, p. 13473 (1 December 1921); 
Lee, Industrial Peace Act, op. cit., p. 21 ff; Royal Commission on the Constitution, Report, op.
cit., p. 182. 
44 Mr Brennan, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 98, pp. 13403-4 (30 November 
1921); James Joseph Macken, Australian Industrial Laws: The Constitutional Basis, 2nd edn, 
Law Book Co, Sydney, 1980, pp. 255-6. 
45 Federated Felt Hatting Employees Union of Australasia v. Denton Hat Mills Ltd (1914) 18 
CLR 88 per Griffith CJ at 91. 
46 Merchant Service Guild of Australasia v. Newcastle and Hunter River Steamship Co. Ltd (No. 
1) (1913) 16 CLR 591; R v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex p. G.P. 
Jones (Builders Labourers' Case) (1914) 18 CLR 224; R v. President of the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex p. William Holyman & Sons Ltd (1914) 18 CLR 273. 
47 S.M. Bruce, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 102, p. 86 (1 Mar 1923). 
48 M. Charlton, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 103, p. 66 (14 June 1923). 
49 Sydney Morning Herald, 18 May 1926, p. 9; Worker, 26 May 1926, p. 1. 
50 S.M. Bruce, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 113, pp. 2164, 2168 (20 May 1926); 
J.G. Latham, ibid., p. 2837 (9 June 1926); Worker, 16 June 1926, p. 16. 
51 M. Charlton, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol., 113, p. 2544 (2 June 19256; Mr 
Watt, ibid., p. 2926 (10 June 1926); Worker, 30 June 1926, p. 15; Aaron Wildavsky, ‘The 1926 
 
46 
Referendum’, in Aaron Wildavsky and Dagmar Carboch, Studies in Australian Politics, 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1958, p. 12. 
52 Royal Commission on the Constitution, Report, Government Printer, Canberra, 1929, p. 248. 
For the history of the Royal Commission, see Cheryl Saunders, The Parliament as Partner: A 
Century of Constitutional Review, Research paper 2, 2000-01, Department of the Parliamentary 
Library, Canberra, 2000, pp. 15-16. 
53 Royal Commission on the Constitution, Report, op. cit., pp. 245, 302.  
54 D.H. Drummond, ‘The General Case for Revision of the Constitution’, in David Maughan et 
al., Constitutional Revision in Australia, Australasian Publishing Co., Sydney, 1944, p. 37. 
55 Constitutional Alteration (Post War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights) Bill 1944. 
56 Report from the Joint Committee on Constitutional Review, 1959, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Papers, 1959-60, vol. 3, p. 403, paras 727-32. 
57 Ibid., paras 767, 783. 
58 J.T. Ludeke, ‘The Reference of Industrial Powers from the States to the Commonwealth’, 
Australian Law Journal, vol. 54, 1980, pp. 88-91; Cheryl Saunders, ‘Constitutional Problems 
and Intergovernmental Solutions’, in Jennifer Aldred, ed., Industrial Confrontation, George 
Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, pp. 64, 68. 
59 I. Macphee, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 129, p. 2378 (21 October 
1982); see Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-83, ss. 44B, 44C, inserted by Conciliation 
and Arbitration Amendment Act (No. 2) 1983 (Cwlth), s. 11. 
60 Committee of Review on Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems, Report, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1985, vol. 1 pp. 2-6; vol. 2, pp. 270-295 esp. p. 278. 
61 Constitutional Commission, Advisory Committee on the Distribution of Powers, Report,
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1987, p. 35. 
62 Final Report of the Constitutional Commission, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, vol. 2, p. 800. 
63 On the power to refrain from hearing a dispute, see Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, s. 
41(1)(d)(ii), originally s. 38(h); now Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 111(1)(g)(iii), 
111AAA. P.R. Gray and Shane R. Marshall, ‘Yielding the field: the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission’s Discretion to Refuse to Invoke its own Jurisdiction’, Australian 
Journal of Labour Law, vol. 3, 1990, pp. 36-47; On Federal coverage, see Federated Hotel, 
Club, Restaurants and Caterers’ Employees’ Union v. Abbott (1928) 26 CAR 489; Municipal 
Officers’ Association of Australia v. State Electricity Commission of Victoria (1971) 138 CAR 
500; J.H. Portus, ‘Aspects of the Commonwealth and State Division of the Industrial Power’, in 
G.W. Ford, J.M. Hearn and R.D. Lansbury, eds, Australian Labour Relations: Readings, 3rd 
edn, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1980.  
64 R v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; ex p. Association of 
Professional Engineers, Australia (1959) 107 CLR 208. 
65 R v. Coldham; ex p. Australian Social Welfare Union (1983) 153 CLR 297. 
66 That public sector employees engaged in administrative or governmental functions might not 
be able to gain an award under the Federal system because of the Constitution’s recognition of 
the continued independence of the States (and not because public servants were not employed 
in an industry under the then interpretation of the industry power) was recognised in 
 
47 
Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 (per Rich J at 66, Dixon J at 80). 
Reconsideration of the issue was expressly left open in the Social Welfare Union Case (1983) 
153 CLR at 313. Since then the exception has been recognised for a limited group of 
employees and not in relation to all employment conditions: R v. Lee; ex p. Harper (1986) 160 
CLR 430 at 452-3; Re Australian Education Union; ex p. Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188 at 232; 
Victoria v. Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 503.  
67 Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996 (Vic.), s. 4; Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cwlth), Pt XV, schedule 1A. An exception is made for State public sector employees and 
law enforcement officers: see Dempster v. Comrie (2000) 96 FCR 570. 
68 Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1925, p. 587; ibid., 1930, p. 390; Royal 
Commission on the Constitution, Report, Canberra, Government Printer, 1929, p. 160. 
69 A series of public statements were made by Hughes and Higgins, which were published in the 
Melbourne Argus and reprinted in (1917) 11 CAR 994-1002. 
70 L.F. Fitzhardinge, William Morris Hughes: A Political Biography; vol. 2, The Little Digger,
Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1979, p. 443; Lee, Industrial Peace Act, op. cit., p. 118. 
71 Industrial Peace Act 1920 (Cwlth), ss. 13, 18, 20. 
72 W.M. Hughes, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 92, p. 3109 (29 July 1920); ibid.,
vol. 93, p. 4441 (10 September 1920); Mr Blakeley, ibid., p. 3226; Mr Tudor, ibid., p. 3233 (4 
August 1920); Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1920 (Cwlth); see Lee, 
Industrial Peace Act, op. cit., pp. 161-3. 
73 Statement Made in Court by Mr Justice Higgins on Announcing his Resignation (September 
25, 1920) in Higgins, A New Province, op. cit., pp. 175, 173. 
74 Hon S.M. Bruce, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 103, p. 51 (13 June 1923). 
75 Richard Morris, ‘From the Webbs to Scullin: the Appearance of Industrial Relations as a 
Branch of Knowledge in Australia’, Labour History, no. 64, 1993, p. 81.
76 Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v. Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466; R v. Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration; ex p. Engineers etc (State) Conciliation Committee (1926) 38 
CLR 563. 
77 Laura Bennett, ‘The Federal Conciliation and Arbitration Court in the Late 1920s’, Labour 
History, no. 57, November 1989, pp. 49-50.  
78 J.G. Latham, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 113, p. 2234 (21 May 1926); Mr 
West, ibid., p. 3227 (17 June 1926); Senator Pearce, ibid., p. 3359 (22 June 1926); 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-26 (Cwlth), s. 18B. 
79 J.G. Latham, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 117, pp. 3277, 3279 (15 December 
1927). 
80 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-28 (Cwlth), ss. 38C, 35A, 7-8, 56D, 
86D, amended by Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1928 (Cwlth). 
81 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-28 (Cwlth), s. 25D. 
82 Mr Scullin, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 118, pp. 4892, 4896, 4902 (16 May 
1928); Mr Blakeley, ibid., p. 4912.
48 
83 Transport Workers Act 1928 (Cwlth); Richard Morris, ‘The 1928 Marine Cooks’ Strike and the 
Origins of the Transport Workers’ Act’, Great Circle, vol. 21, 1999, pp. 109-120. The 
regulations were enacted into legislation by the Transport Workers Act 1929 (Cwlth). 
84 S.M. Bruce, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 120, p. 676 (15 February 1929). 
85 Ibid., vol. 120, p. 330 (1 March 1929). 
86 Dagmar Carboch, ‘The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government’, in Aaron Wildavsky and Dagmar 
Carboch, Studies in Australian Politics, op. cit., pp. 133, 193. 
87 S.M. Bruce, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 121, p. 289 (23 August 1929); 
Maritime Industries Bill 1929, cll. 6, 9(2), 13, 24, 30.  
88 W.M. Hughes, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 121, p. 596 (5 September 1929). 
89 W.M. Hughes, ibid., p. 841 (10 September 1929). 
90 Carboch, ‘The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government’, op. cit., p. 270-4; Geoffrey Sawer, 
Australian Federal Politics and Law 1929-1949, Melbourne U.P., 1963, pp. 2-4. For a 
summary of election results see Colin A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian 
Government and Politics, 1890-1964, ANU Press, Canberra, 1968, p. 613. 
91 Mr Brennan, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 124, p. 2364 (30 May 1930); 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-30 s. 34; Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, vol. 126, p. 5666 (8 August 1930).  
92 Australian Railways Union v. Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930) 44 CLR 319 at 385. 
93 Orwell de R. Foenander, Towards Industrial Peace in Australia, Melbourne, U.P., 1937, p. 64. 
94 National Security (Industrial Peace) Regulations 1940 (Cwlth), SR 1940, No. 290; Orwell de 
R. Foenander, Wartime Labour Developments in Australia, Melbourne, U.P., 1943, pp. 5-8; 
S.J. Butlin, War Economy, 1939-1942, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1955, p. 245-6. 
95 S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, War Economy, 1942-1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 
1977, pp. 26, 372, 555-6. 
96 T. Sheridan, Mindful Militants The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia, 1920-1972, 
Cambridge U.P., 1975, p. 170; Jim Hagan, The History of the ACTU, Melbourne, Longman 
Cheshire, 1981, p. 118. 
97 Report on the Coal-Mining Industry, vol. 1, Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1945-46, 
vol. 3, pp. 468-71; Mr Dedman, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 188, p. 3009 (24 
July 1946); J.B. Chifley, ibid., p. 3273 (30 July 1946); Coal Industry Act 1946 (Cwlth). 
98 H.V. Evatt, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 190, pp. 125-6 (21 February 1947); 
Stevedoring Industry Act 1947 (Cwlth); Mr Dedman, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,
vol. 203, p. 1579 (28 June 1949); H.E. Holt, ibid., p. 1973 (5 July 1949); Stevedoring Industry 
Act 1949 (Cwlth). On the history of the legislation, see R v. Kelly; ex p. Waterside Workers’ 
Federation of Australia (1952) 601 at 626-8; Foenander, Studies in Australian Labour Law and 
Relations, op. cit., pp. 28-32. 
99 Jim Hagan, The History of the ACTU, op, cit., p. 189; Tom Sheridan, ‘Planners and the 
Australian Labour Market 1945-1949’, Labour History, no. 53, November 1987, p. 104. 
100 H. V. Evatt, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 190, p. 548 (12 Mar 1947).  
101 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-47 (Cwlth), ss. 4, 13, 24, 25. 
 
49 
102 R.G. Menzies, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 190, p. 1304 (16 Apr 1947). 
103 Orwell de R. Foenander, Studies in Australian Labour Law and Relations, Melbourne, U.P., 
1952, pp. 72, 82-85; Braham Dabscheck, Arbitrator at Work: Sir William Raymond Kelly and 
the Regulation of Australian Industrial Relations, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983, p. 
142. 
104 R v. Galvin; ex p. Metal Trades Employers’ Association (1949) 77 CLR 432. 
105 Tom Sheridan, Division of Labour: Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945-1949,
Oxford U.P., Melbourne, 1989, pp. 154-5.  
106 R v. Metal Trade Employers’ Association; ex p. Amalgamated Engineering Union Australian 
Section (1951) 82 CLR 208; Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1951 (Cwlth), ss. 29(c), 
29A inserted by Conciliation and Arbitration Act (No 2) 1951 (Cwlth), ss. 6-7; Jack Hutson, 
Penal Colony to Penal Powers, revised edn, Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights’ 
Union, Sydney, 1983, p. 238. 
107 R v. Kirby; ex p. Boilermakers Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 at 289; affirmed by 
Privy Council (1957) 95 CLR 529. For the immediate significance, see Orwell de R. 
Foenander, Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration in Australia, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1959, 
pp. 21-24. 
108 See the economic statement by the Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, H. R.  vol. 9, p. 788 (14 March 1956). 
109 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R.  vol. 9, pp. 20, 25 (15 February 1956); ibid., p.
524 (6 March 1956); Blanche d’Alpuget, Mediator: A Biography of Sir Richard Kirby,
Melbourne UP, Melbourne, 1977, pp. 141-147; H.E.  Holt, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Debates, H. R.  vol. 9, p. 643 (8 March 1956); ibid., vol. 10, p. 1991 (10 May 1956); D.W. 
Oxnam, ‘Recent Changes in the Federal Arbitration System’, Australian Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 
1, March 1957, p. 80. 
110 H.E. Holt, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R.  vol. 10, p. 1989-90 (10 May 1956). 
111 H.V. Evatt, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R.  vol. 10, p. 2343 (22 May 1956). 
112 Kenneth F. Walker, ‘Arbitration in a New Key’, Economic Record, vol. 33, 1957, p. 60. 
113 R v. Kelly; ex p. Australian Railways Union (1953) 89 CLR 461 per Dixon CJ at 474-5. 
114 Hutson, Penal Colony to Penal Powers, op. cit., p. 265; Jim Hagan, The History of the ACTU,
op. cit., p. 268. 
115 These were the ‘one man bus’ cases: R v. Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission; ex p. Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board (1965) 113 CLR 228; R v. 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; ex p. Melbourne and Metropolitan 
Tramways Board (1966) CLR 443; Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board v. Horan 
(1967) 117 CLR 78; see E.I. Sykes and H.J. Glasbeek, Labour Law in Australia, Butterworths, 
Sydney, 1972, pp. 521-6, 560. 
116 Hutson, Penal Colony to Penal Powers, op. cit., pp. 267-9; Industrial Registrar and Australian 
Tramway and Motor Omnibus Employees Association (1969) 24 Industrial Information 
Bulletin 700; Sydney Morning Herald, 16 May 1969, p. 4.  
117 Senator Murphy, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, S. vol. 41, pp. 1371 (20 May 1969). 
118 Mr Bury, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 63, p. 2113 (22 May 1969). 
 
50 
119 Mr Snedden, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 68, p. 3080 (5 June 1970); 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-70, ss. 32A, 33A, inserted by Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1970 (Cwlth). 
120 Mr Cameron, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 83, p. 1424 (12 April 1973). 
121 Ibid., p. 1425. 
122 Ibid., p. 1436; Mr Lynch, ibid., p. 1755 (8 May 1973); Mr McMahon, ibid., p. 1775; Mr 
Cameron, ibid, vol. 85, p. 662 (30 August 1973); Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1973.
123 Richard Mitchell, ‘Industrial Relations Under a Conservative Government: The Coalition’s 
Labour Law Programme 1975 to 1978’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 21, 1979, pp. 435-
7; Richard Mitchell, “Australian Industrial Relations and Labour Law Policy: A Post-War 
Review’, Australian Quarterly, vol. 52, 1980, pp. 49-57. 
124 M. Young, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R.  vol. 105, p. 1748 (24 May 1977; R. 
Willis, ibid., pp. 1818-20 (25 May 1977). 
125 Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-79, s. 25A (Commission not able to award pay for 
period of industrial action), s. 143A (power of Governor-General to suspend or cancel 
registration of organisation if found by a Full Bench of Commission to have engaged in 
industrial action), inserted by Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1979 (Cwlth). 
126 Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Bill 1982 (Cwlth); Mr Beazley, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 127, p. 1808 (22 April 1982); ibid., S. vol. 94, p. 1858 (5 
May 1982). 
127 R v. Coldham; ex p. Australian Social Welfare Union (1983) 153 CLR 297; Federated Clerks’ 
Union v. Victorian Employers’ Federation (1984) 154 CLR 472; Re Manufacturing Grocers’ 
Employees Federation of Australia; ex p. Australian Chamber of Manufactures (1986) 160 
CLR 341; Re Cram; ex p. New South Wales Colliery Proprietors’ Association Ltd (1987) 163 
CLR 117; see Esther Stern, ‘”Industrial Disputes” and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Industrial 
Tribunal: An Analysis of Recent Developments’, Australian Journal of Labour Law, vol. 3, 
1990, pp. 130-158. 
128 ‘Statement of Accord by the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions Regarding Economic Policy, February 1983’, in Frank Stilwell, The Accord and 
Beyond, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1986, p. 167. 
129 Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems (Hancock Report), 
Report, vol. 2, AGPS, Canberra, p. 214. 
130 Ibid., pp. 169, 205, 241-2. 
131 Ibid., pp. 401, 403.
132 Ibid., pp. 340-1. 
133 Ibid., pp. 399, 425.
134 Mr Willis, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 155, p. 3165-6 (14 May 1987). 
135 Ibid., pp. 3167, 3171-2 (14 May 1987); Industrial Relations Bill 1987 (Cwlth), cll. 62, 164-8, 
193-7, 215-7. 
136 Mr Hawke, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 155, p. 3293 (26 May 1987); 
Senator Chaney, ibid., S. vol. 121, p. 3004 (27 May 1987); Senator Aulich, ibid., p. 3009;
51 
Braham Dabscheck, Australian Industrial Relations in the 1980s, Oxford U.P., Melbourne, 
1989, p. 146.  
137 Governor-General’s Speech, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, H. R. vol. 156, p. 14 (14 
September 1987); Mr Willis, ibid., H. R. vol. 161, p. 2335 (28 April 1988). 
138 Senator Chaney, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, S. vol. 128, p. 192 (24 August 1988); 
ibid., pp. 571-2 (31 August 1988); ibid., p. 658 (1 September 1988); ibid., pp. 820-1 (27 
September 1988). 
139 Senator Chapman, ibid., S. vol. 129, p. 1225 (12 October 1988); Senator Cook, ibid., p. 1229.
140 Edward M. Davis and Russell D. Lansbury, ‘Employment Relations in Australia’, in Greg J. 
Bamber and Russell D. Lansbury, eds, International and Comparative Employment Relations: 
A Study of Industrialised Market Economies, revised edn, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998, p. 
135; Russell D. Lansbury and Greg J. Bamber, ‘The End of Institutionalised Industrial 
Relations in Australia?’, Perspectives on Work, vol. 2, no. 1, 1998, pp. 26-28. 
141 Braham Dabscheck, The Struggle for Australian Industrial Relations, Oxford U.P., Melbourne, 
1995, ch. 3. 
142 Davis and Lansbury, ‘Employment Relations in Australia’, op. cit., p. 136. 
143 National Wage Case, April 1991 (1991) 36 IR 120. 
144 National Wage Case, October 1991 (1991) 39 IR 127. A ministerial statement announcing the 
intention to bring in new legislation was made while the National Wage Case was still in 
progress: Senate Weekly Hansard, no. 18, 1991, pp. 2279, 2284 (17 October 1991).  
145 Industrial Relations Act 1988-92, Pt VI Div. 3A (especially s. 134F), inserted by Industrial 
Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (Cwlth).  
146 Industrial Relations Act 1988-93, s. 88A(b). Paid-rates awards specified actual rather than 
minimum entitlements, but were only made if it was not appropriate or likely for the matters to 
be settled by agreement: s. 170UA. 
147 Review of Wage Fixing Principles August 1994 (1994) 55 IR 144, Print L4700. 
148 Victoria v. Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 537-8.  
149 Commonwealth v. Tasmania (Tasmanian Dams Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1; Richardson v. 
Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261; Queensland v. Commonwealth (1989) 167 CLR 
232. 
150 Ronald C. McCallum, ‘The Internationalisation of Australian Industrial Law: The Industrial 
Relations Reform Act 1993’, Sydney Law Review, vol. 15, 1994, p. 134. 
151 J. Howard, House of Representatives Weekly Hansard, no. 12, 1993, p. 3355 (22 November 
1993); Senator Crane, Senate Weekly Hansard, no. 14, 1993, p. 3897 (6 December 1993). 
152 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 487, 496. 
153 L. Brereton, House of Representatives Weekly Hansard, no. 10, 1993, p. 2782 (28 October 
1993); P. Slipper, ibid., no. 11, 1993, p. 3077 (17 November 1993); Senator Sherry, Senate 
Weekly Hansard, no. 14, 1993, p. 3951; Industrial Relations Act 1988-93, ss. 170NA(1), 
170NC(1)(c). 
 
52 
154 House of Representatives Weekly Hansard, no. 10, 1993, p. 2782 (28 October 1993); Industrial 
Relations Act 1988-93 (Cwlth), ss. 170NC(1)(b), inserted by Industrial Relations Reform Act 
1993 (Cwlth). 
155 P. Reith, House of Representatives Weekly Hansard, no. 3, 1996, p. 1295 (23 May 1996). 
156 Workplace Relations Act 1996, ss. 88A-88B, 89, 89A, 111AAA. 
157 Workplace Relations and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 1996, schedule 13. 
158 Supplementary Report by Senator Andrew Murray for the Australian Democrats, Senate 
Economics References Committee, Report on Consideration of the Workplace Relations and 
Other Legislation Amendment Bill 1996, Senate Printing Unit, Canberra. 1996, pp. 328, 330. 
331. 
159 Ibid., p. 334.
160 Agreement between the Commonwealth Government and the Australian Democrats on the 
Workplace Relations Bill, October 1996; Australian, 28 October 1996, p. 1; Senate Weekly 
Hansard, no. 12, 1996, pp. 4719-21. 
161 Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999 (Cwlth); 
Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education Legislation 
Committee, Consideration of the Provisions of the Workplace Relations Legislation 
Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay) Bill 1999, Senate Printing Unit, Canberra, 1999, Democrat 
Senators’ Report, pp. 389-92. 
162 Re Pacific Coal Pty Ltd; ex p. Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2000] HCA 
34; 172 ALR 257 per Kirby J at para 297. 
163 Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cwlth), s.89A(7). The Commission may also make an award 
covering non-allowable matters if it has terminated the bargaining period: ss.170MW, 170MX.   
164 Hon Peter Reith, ‘Getting the Outsiders Inside - Towards A Rational Workplace Relations 
System In Australia’, Ministerial Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 24 March 
1999, [http:// www.simplerwrsystem.govau/discussion/outsidersinside.htm#alternative] 
(18/11/00), and supporting discussion papers located at this site. For an analysis of this 
proposal, see Andrew Stewart, Federal labour Law and New Uses for the Corporations Power,
Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training, Working Paper no. 61, 2000, 
[http://www.econ.usyd.edu.au/acirrt/pubs/cp.pdf], (20/1/01). 
165 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Industrial Relations in the “Frozen” Continent’, Australian Journal of 
Labour Law, vol. 2, 1989, p. 5. 
166 See Carol Fox and Marilyn Pittard, Amending the Industrial Relations Statute: An Australian 
Preoccupation, National Key Centre in Industrial Relations, Monash University, Working 
Paper no. 69, 1999, pp. 12, 23. 
167 A Ministry of Labour Advisory Council was formed in 1952, and was succeeded by the 
National Labour Advisory Council in 1967. While these were created by executive action, the 
most recent body was a statutory creation: National Labour Consultative Council Act 1977 
(Cwlth). 
168 Consolidated Register of Senate Committee Reports 1970-1988, Senate Committee Office, 
Canberra, 1998, pp. 174-176.  
 
53 
169 See R.J. Buchanan and I.M. Neil, ‘Industrial Law and the Constitution in the New Century: An 
Historical Review of the Industrial Power’, Australian Bar Review, vol. 20, 2000, p. 263; Neil 
Williams and Andrew Gotting, ‘The Interrelationship between the Industrial Power and other 
Heads of Power in Australian Industrial Law’, Australian Bar Review, vol. 20, 2000, pp. 265-
82. 
